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Abstract
The existing literature identifies different indicators to construct organized crime 
indices and places equal importance to different concepts of organized crime. This 
paper examines the sensitivity of organized crime across Italian provinces when 
different set of indicators and weights are used to combine crime indicators. Our 
findings suggest that there is a remarkable variation in the distribution of organized 
crime across Italian provinces based on the choice of indicators and the importance 
given to different crime indicators. It is also found that the relationship of organized 
crime with socioeconomic and political factors varies depending on the normative 
choices made in the construction of an organized crime index.
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1 Introduction
Considering the interdependent links between organized crime and the politi-
cal and socio-economic settings, the economic analysis of crime has grown to 
become an important research agenda (Gonzalez-Ruiz and Buscaglia 2002; 
Pinotti 2020). Organized crime has, in fact, extensive economic consequences: 
in the short term, violence and predatory activities destroy part of the physical 
and human capital stock; in the long run, the presence of criminal organizations 
increases the riskiness and uncertainty of the business environment, which ulti-
mately lowers the growth potential of the economy (Pinotti 2015a, b).
From a theoretical point of view, only a limited number of research papers 
examined the economics of organized crime. Becker’s (1968) pioneering arti-
cle shows that even individuals involved in illegal or criminal activities behave 
rationally. The idea of Becker’s model is that a rational offender faces a gamble: 
the individual rationally decides whether or not to commit a crime by compar-
ing benefits and costs of crime with those of alternative (legitimate) activities. 
Consequently, if the government enhances the probability and severity of punish-
ment, crime becomes less attractive. The economic literature has also stressed 
welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive supply of illegal activi-
ties. Buchanan (1973) argues that monopoly in the supply of illegal activities is 
socially desirable because of the output restriction, while Backhaus (1979) argues 
that passive approval in the monopolized syndication of crime should lead to an 
increase of illegal activities. There is relatively recent literature in economics that 
supports the former view since market competition should generate higher crime 
rates and corruption (Kugler et al. 2005), violence, and other negative externali-
ties (Becker et  al. 2006; Levitt and Venkathesh 2000). Most of the theoretical 
contributions focus on the conflict between criminal organizations and govern-
ment agencies since they compete for control over the territory. For instance, 
Shelling (1971–1984a; 1984b) describes how an organized criminal group (such 
as the mafia) may be able to extort payments from firms to protect them from 
other criminals and enforcement of property rights. In this sense, the mafia can 
be seen as an alternative tax collector and provider of public goods taking the 
place of government (Alexeev et al. 2004). Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003) analyze 
how criminal organizations strategically use violence to manipulate elected poli-
ticians. Moreover, Dal Bó et al. (2006) present a model where a criminal group 
could influence public officers using both monetary incentives and self-enforcea-
ble punishments within a unified framework. Along this line, Alesina et al. (2019) 
analyze how organized crime could manipulate electoral results and politicians’ 
behavior using pre-electoral violence.
From an empirical point of view, despite the lack of a common definition of 
organized crime and the complexity of the phenomenon, there have been several 
attempts to measure its presence and effect at the local, national, and international 
levels. Messner et al. (1999) and Anselin (2000) showed that the location of illegal 
activity could supply relevant insights into the exploration of crime dynamics. In 
this regard, Italian crime has particular qualitative and quantitative features. Crime 
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activities vary across time and space, and organized crime, like Mafia, Camorra, 
‘Ndrangheta, has territorial roots in some southern regions (Marselli and Vannini 
1997) and have spread to many other parts of the country (Buonanno and Pazzona 
2014). Criminal activities in a given region could be considered as a good proxy 
for the socioeconomic development differences among regions. Relatedly, both Peri 
(2004) and Centorrino and Ofria (2008) showed how organized crime could influ-
ence both economic growth and the quality of local institutional systems. Pinotti 
(2015a) shows that in Southern Italy, the presence of mafia decreases GDP per 
capita by 16%. Among the few macroeconomic studies which have provided a for-
malization of the impact of organized crime on income, Centorrino and Signorino 
(1993, 1997) estimate the impact of criminality on total fiscal revenues accounting 
also for the income not produced in the economy because of the mafia’s presence. 
Their results suggest that, in Italy, the loss of revenues due to income not produced 
in the economy because of the mafia presence is equal to 0.7% of GDP. Torres-
Preciado et al. (2017) demonstrated that criminal activities (particularly homicides 
and robbery) hamper economic growth across Mexican states. Cracolici and Uberti 
(2009) investigated the relationship between crime and some socioeconomic vari-
ables for Italian provinces and found that the presence of foreigners and the level of 
young male unemployment are related to criminal activities. Battisti et al. (2020) 
provide evidence that organized crime is more prevalent in Italian regions in which 
inequality is high and social mobility is low.
Organized crime increases the risks for (and the costs of) investment because 
of possible attacks, intimidation, and the destruction of property. In this respect, 
Daniele and Marani (2011) demonstrated that the presence of organized crime is 
an obstacle for the attractiveness of the local economy leading to lower levels of 
foreign direct investment inflows. Lavezzi (2008) argued that organized crime also 
operates in the legal sector for money laundering and removing any trace of these 
crimes. Through money laundering, the criminal organizations employ the proceeds 
of crime in the legal economy, infiltrating mainly the traditional manufacturing sec-
tors characterized by small and medium firms that use low levels of technology and 
human capital (Capuano and Giacalone 2018). Besides, there is the lost fiscal rev-
enue due to evasion induced by the same mafia presence (Daniele 2009). Ganau and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2018) showed that organized crime has a direct negative effect on 
agglomeration and clustering of small and medium-sized enterprises hampering its 
productivity growth. Fabrizi et  al. (2019) and Calamunci and Drago (2020) dem-
onstrated that when a criminal firm is eliminated from a relevant market, the per-
formance of non-criminal competitors significantly increases both in terms of effi-
ciency and turnover. Looking at the housing sector, Battisti et al. (2019) show that 
mafia homicides have a negative and significant impact on house prices while Boeri 
et al. (2019) unveil a positive effect of re-allocations of confiscated real estate assets.
Another strand of literature investigates the relation between the presence of organ-
ized crime and politics. This literature examines the impact of organized crime on 
democratic governance, which is fulfilled by the manipulation of the electoral out-
comes (Acemoglu et  al. 2013; Daniele and Geys 2015). Along this line, Daniele 
and Dipoppa (2017) analyzed how organized crime manipulates electoral outcomes 
using violence. Moreover, De Feo and De Luca (2017) showed that mafia obtained 
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economic advantages in exchange for its electoral support while Di Cataldo and Mas-
trorocco (2020) revealed that local governments infiltrated by criminal organization 
spent more for the construction sector and waste management than in other areas of 
public utility. Given the negative consequences of illegal activities on regional socio-
economic development, policymakers placed a growing emphasis on the measurement 
of organized crime to help them understand the crime patterns and trends.
From the measurement point of view, as highlighted by Savona et al. (2012), quan-
tifying and understanding organized crime is complex because of the high number 
of dimensions that should be taken into consideration. However, the measurement 
of organized crime (e.g., in the forms of indices) should be addressed to investigate 
its impact and to provide policy recommendations to mitigate its negative effects 
(Sansò-Rubert Pascual 2017). Henceforth, to track organised crime and to examine 
its effect on socioeconomic factors, construction of composite organised crime indi-
ces have become popular (see e.g. Calderoni 2011; Dugato et al. 2014, 2020). There 
are many judgement calls to be made while constructing an organised crime index 
such as the selection of crime types, weight allocation across crime types and so on 
(see OECD 2008 for detailed procedures on the construction of indices). This paper 
focuses on the choice of weights given to each crime indicator. It should be noted that 
even though the crime distribution does not change with the allocation of different 
weights on the crime indicators, policymakers still choose weights to obtain a single 
composite crime measure with an overall spatial and temporal variation in organised 
crime. In this paper, we obtain weights of crime variables that lead to the highest and 
lowest measured organised crime across Italian provinces with the use of stochastic 
dominance efficiency (SDE) methodology. Obtaining the highest and lowest measured 
organised crime outcomes across provinces is particularly important as this leads to a 
feasible range of organised crime, useful to policymakers as it allows them to assess 
the sensitivity of the organised crime measures to alternative weight choices. Further-
more, it would offer them a feasible range of organised crime outcomes for Italian 
provinces irrespective of the importance (weight) attached to a given crime indicator. 
Since there is no theoretical reason to believe that one crime indicator is more impor-
tant than any other, rather than obtaining indices based on alternative weights and the 
potential manipulation of such indices based on weight choices, this paper offers a 
feasible range of an organised crime index with the use of the SDE methodology. In 
short, irrespective of the importance (weight) attached to different crime indicators, 
the organised crime index for a given region would lie between a minimum and maxi-
mum organized crime outcome obtained with our approach.
The previous literature used different set of methodologies to obtain organised 
crime variables (indices). For instance, the empirical literature using organised 
crime variables to assess its effect on socioeconomic variables usually aggregates 
different set of indicators (see e.g., Daniele and Marani 2011; Neanidis et  al. 
2017) or obtains equally-weighted organised crime indices (e.g., see e.g. Calde-
roni 2011; Dugato et  al. 2014). Using equal weights implies that all the crime 
indicators used in the analysis have the same importance (Decancq and Lugo 
2013; Greco et al. 2019). Furthermore, it has been argued that if the variables are 
highly and positively correlated, any index constructed by using these variables 
would be redundant (see e.g., McGillivray 2005; Foster et al. 2013 among many 
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others that examine the redundancy of the HDI by using correlation analysis) as 
using indicators that are highly and positively correlated leads to a ‘double count-
ing’ problem (OECD 2008). In that respect, Calderoni (2011) using correlation 
analysis to identify the set of crime variables that are positively associated with 
the mafia-related crime variables as part of a composite index, faces the above 
problem of ‘double counting’. Hence, using correlation analysis to identify the 
indicators to be included in the construction of a composite index leads to cer-
tain measurement flaws. Another popular method that is used to obtain compos-
ite indices is principal component analysis (see e.g., Ogwang and Abdou 2003; 
Singh et al. 2012; Smits and Steendijk 2015; Dugato et al. 2020). The idea behind 
principal component analysis is to capture the highest variation possible in the 
original variables with as few variables as possible (Ram 1982). In that case, this 
method aims to combine indicators that construct the index with weights that 
are more ‘objective’ by overcoming the arbitrary weight choices of policymak-
ers (Ray 2008). However, principal component analysis only considers second 
moments of the variables after standardizing for a common mean. This would be 
adequate if the data were characterized solely by the first two moments, but this is 
usually not the case for most of the variables used in empirical work.
More importantly, constructing an index based on equal weights, correlation analy-
sis or principal component analysis may produce a composite organised crime index 
that gives the impression that the situation is “not that bad” or it is “extremely bad”. 
For instance, inclusion of a variable that is positively correlated with mafia-related 
crimes (via correlation analysis) or explains sufficient variation in the overall data 
(via principal component analysis) could result to lower or higher measured organised 
crime. Henceforth to avoid the potential effect of the choice of variables and weights 
given to the indicators, which would be ignored by existing methods, the methodol-
ogy used in this paper allows us to obtain weights that would result in highest and 
lowest measured organised crime across Italian provinces and would offer a feasible 
range of organised crime outcomes for all provinces considered irrespective of the 
weight choices. Our study aims to provide a statistical construction of a feasible range 
of organised crime outcomes across Italian provinces by avoiding the arbitrariness of 
indicator and variable choices. In Italy, indeed, organized crime is a long-lasting phe-
nomenon, and criminal organizations have a pervasive control over the territory allow-
ing criminal groups to engage in complex criminal activities (e.g., smuggling and 
drug-trafficking) as well as threatening local politicians and public officials. Moreover, 
the widespread presence of criminal organizations in southern regions has affected its 
socioeconomic environment (Pinotti 2015a; Acemoglu et  al. 2020) which partially 
explains Italy’s long-term regional differences (Felice 2018). Despite the relevance of 
organized crime for Italy, there are only two measures of organized crime indices: the 
index computed by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and the map-
ping realized by MA.CR.O. (MAppatura CRiminalità Organizzata) Project. Therefore, 
there is a need for a systematic analysis of the sensitivity of organised crime across 
Italian provinces based on the normative choices, and the relevance of measurement of 
organised crime for the socio-economic development.
Our paper offers several insights. First, we examine the sensitivity of organ-
ized crime across Italian provinces based on the indicator choice and importance 
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attached to the chosen indicators. Second, we provide a measurement of the phe-
nomenon in Italy at a province-level highlighting the geographic differences in 
organized crime. Third, rather than relying on normative judgment calls to obtain 
an organized crime index we obtain weights for each crime variable that leads to 
the worst and best measured organized crime index (highlighting the variation of 
organized crime based on weight choices) with the use of the SDE methodology. 
Most of the existing literature obtain organized crime indices either by summing dif-
ferent crime variables or assigning equal weights to them, suggesting that each type 
of crime is given equal importance. Fourth, based on the proposed two extreme case 
indices, we discuss which type of crime indicators would require national and/or 
local policies and also examine the relationships of various organized crime indices 
with other socio-economic variables.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the detailed stages for the 
construction of organized crime index, detailed literature on the way that organized 
crime is measured, and offers the data used in this paper. Section  3 provides the 
SDE methodology used to obtain a combination of different concepts of organized 
crime for 103 Italian provinces. Section  4 provides the results obtained with the 
SDE methodology, and finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2  Construction of organized crime index
Constructing any multidimensional (multivariate) index is a non-trivial task. OECD 
(2008) offers the detailed steps on how to construct composite indicators (indexes), 
which requires the following steps: (1) the definition of the concept to be measured, 
(2) selection of the indicators, (3) normalization of the indicators, and (4) the choice of 
the aggregation method to put these indicators together to obtain the composite index.
To carry out the steps mentioned above, this section is organized as follows. In 
Sect.  2.1, we first provide a detailed literature review on how organized crime is 
measured by the existing literature, which would guide us about the set of indica-
tors that we can utilize to construct an organized crime index. Section 2.2 introduces 
the data set used in this paper. Then Sect. 2.3 provides the normalization procedure 
used to convert each variable before the aggregation, and finally, Sect. 2.4 provides 
the aggregation methodologies used by the previous literature to combine the set of 
variables to obtain organized crime index.
2.1  Literature
There has been an increasing strand of literature that examines the relationship 
between organized crime and socio-economic and political factors. Table 1 presents 
a summary of the most relevant literature that describes the measurement of organ-
ized crime and the main findings.
For measuring organized crime, some papers use indices computed as the sum of 
different sets of crime variables (see e.g., Daniele and Marani 2011; Ganau and Rod-
ríguez-Pose 2018; Neanidis et al. 2017; Pinotti 2015a, b among many others). Others, 
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European Journal of Law and Economics 
instead, employ a composite index. Composite indicators are indeed increasingly used 
both by researchers and by law enforcement agencies. For example, the so-called 
‘Composite Organized Crime Index’ proposed by van Dijk (2007) combines data on 
the perceived prevalence of organized crime in the country. Regarding Italy, ISTAT 
(2010) provides an Organized Crime Index (OCI) that measures regional trends on the 
presence of mafia in Italy even though this index does not allow for regional compari-
sons (see also Caglayan et al. 2018; Calderoni 2011; Dugato et al. 2020 for construc-
tion of organized crime indices for Italian municipalities and provinces). Even though 
some literature on organized crime attempts to measure organized crime using factor 
analysis (Caglayan et al. 2018; Dugato et al. 2020), neither of the existing literature 
examined the extent to which organized crime may vary due to alternative indicator 
and weight choices, which is the aim of this paper.
2.2  Variables
Organized crime is extremely complex, for this reason there several definitions of 
this phenomenon derived from different epistemological perspectives as well as the 
analysis of criminal codes and case studies. After a systematic literature review, 
Albanese (2015) suggests two primary categories of illegal behaviour that reflect the 
individual crimes associated with organized crime activity, namely the provision of 
illicit services and goods and the infiltration of legitimate business or government. 
The first category represents the main source of income for criminal organizations, 
since the supply of goods or services prohibited by law allows criminal organiza-
tions to acquire monopoly control of certain illegal major market. Specific offences 
in this category include for instance drug trafficking, smuggling of migrants or 
usury. The second category, infiltration in legitimate business and government, rep-
resents a way to obtain a dominant position in the local economy as well as insti-
tutional level. Profits that come from black market activities are invested into legal 
business by strengthening the presence of criminal organizations within the terri-
tory. These proceedings are used to corrupt public officials both at the local and 
state level to provoke political instability and to protect organized criminal groups 
from law enforcement (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2018). As suggested by Calde-
roni (2014), we can expand the analysis including a third category, which is the “use 
of violence, threat or intimidation”, that gathers offenses aiming to control, directly 
or indirectly, politics and local enterprise network. Specific offences in this cate-
gory include for instance extortion to employers or employees, vandalism or vio-
lent attacks against politicians, journalists and law enforcement agencies. Finally, 
to emphasize the dimension of criminal conspiracy, we can also include types of 
criminal activities that occur when two or more persons agree to constitute a crimi-
nal association with the aim to perpetuate their criminal schemes over time. As sug-
gested by Dugato et al. (2020), the number of criminal or mafia association help us 
to quantify the presence of organized crime within the territory.
Composite indices consists of sub-groups that are clustered under different 
themes that consist of different set of indicators that are measuring similar theo-
retical concepts (see OECD 2008 for detailed explanation on this). For instance, the 
 European Journal of Law and Economics
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FEEM sustainability index is conceptually divided into three concepts of sustain-
ability (economic, social and environmental sustainability), which covers different 
set of indicators under the general themes (see Carraro et al. 2013; Pinar et al. 2014 
for the details). Similarly, the Environmental Performance Index also consists of 
different indicators under main themes such as air quality, biodiversity and habitat 
where different set of indicators under each theme that are related to the concept is 
listed (see Wendling et al. 2020). In this paper, we follow a similar approach to clus-
ter indicators under four main themes which we discussed at the beginning of this 
section: (1) Criminal conspiracy; (2) Provision of illicit goods and services; (3) Use 
of violence, threat or intimidation; (4) Infiltration of legitimate business or Govern-
ment. Table 2 lists the four dimensions previously discussed, the indicators identi-
fied within each area for the Italian provinces and the respective definitions.
We only consider the period between 2004 and 2014 as the system of crime data col-
lection changed in 2004 when a new database of the Italian Ministry of Interior called 
Investigation System (“Sistema di Indagine”—SDI) was established. In particular, the 
Investigation System allows all police forces to report a wide range of information 
about each crime such as type of offense, victim’s details, geo-location of the crime. 
All this information is then inserted in a centralized database thereby avoiding both loss 
of data and possible cases of double counting. Hence, we use the series started in 2004 
with the introduction of the SDI to avoid potential inconsistencies with the previous 
series (Ministry of Interior, Rapporto sulla criminalità e la Sicurezza in Italia 2007).1
Some offenses are connected with organized crime activities by definition, for 
example, mafia-type and criminal associations, mafia murders, councils dissolved 
due to mafia infiltration, and assets confiscated from organized crime. Other vari-
ables need a brief discussion to understand how and why they should be used to 
construct an organized crime index.
Starting with the “provision of illicit goods and services” dimension, Catino 
(2014) suggests that drug trafficking and usury can be seen as the core business of 
criminal organizations since these activities ensure high levels of profits. Moreover, 
Mennella (2011) expands the analysis to include those offenses which are related to 
prostitution and the handling of stolen goods. Turning the discussion to the use of 
“violence, threat or intimidation” dimension, we can observe that extortion is widely 
recognized as one of the most relevant activities of criminal associations (see e.g., 
Pinotti 2015a, b; Ganau and Rodríguez-Pose 2018). Daniele and Marani (2011) and 
Calderoni (2011) also argue that the presence of criminal organizations within the 
territory can be detected when arson, damage, kidnapping and criminal attack-type 
of offenses are observed. To conclude the discussion, Van Dijk (2007) recommends 
the inclusion of money-laundering and corruption-related offenses since the former 
facilitates penetration of the legitimate economy while the latter type of offenses 
increases the power of criminal groups over the relevant economic activity.
To allow for comparability across different provinces, we standardize each type of 
crime variable with the population of a given province. Each respective crime variable 
1 We exclude the bombing/incendiary attacks, bank/postal robbery, smuggling and track robbery vari-
ables from our analysis as these variables have some missing information for some years between 2004 
and 2014. Since SDE methodology relies on balanced data, inclusion of these variables would limit the 
period of analysis and number of observations..
1 3
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is measured by the official number of crimes per 1,000,000 and published by the Ital-
ian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 
each variable. As can be seen from this table, the presence of different types of crimi-
nal activity varies dramatically. For instance, on average (per year and province), there 
is more presence of damage, threats, fraud, drug-related criminal activities, yet the per 
population presence of mafia-related crime (mafia murders, mafia-type association, 
councils dissolved due to mafia infiltration, and total assets confiscated) and crimes 
associated with corruption, usury and criminal attack are relatively low.
The previous literature used correlation and/or factor analysis (see, e.g., Calde-
roni 2011; Dugato et al. 2020) to determine the set of variables to be included as part 
of the organized crime index. In short, correlation analysis is used to identify which 
variables are strongly related to offenses directly attributable to criminal organiza-
tions, namely mafia murders, mafia-type and criminal association, dissolution of city 
councils due to mafia infiltration and confiscated assets. When all provinces are used 
in the correlation analysis, extortion, kidnapping and arson type of criminal offenses 
are positively and significantly correlated with mafia-related crimes and criminal 
association (see Table 7 for the correlation matrix for correlation coefficients among 
variables when all provinces are considered), but the correlation coefficients among 
variables differ when different geographical clusters are used (see Table  8 for the 
categorization of provinces into geographical clusters, and Tables 9, 10 and 11 for 
correlation coefficients among crime variables when northern, central and southern 
provinces of Italy are used in the analysis, respectively).
We observe that the mafia-type crimes are not correlated with one another, and 
their correlation with other variables is also limited in the northern regions. In the 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Mafia murders 0.95 0.00 3.66 0.00 46.23
Mafia type association 1.44 0.00 4.16 0.00 59.12
Councils dissolved 0.42 0.00 2.43 0.00 36.39
Assets confiscated 6.41 0.00 23.08 0.00 384.05
Extortion 101.64 92.81 49.69 6.97 386.00
Kidnapping 23.89 22.42 13.36 0.00 97.35
Criminal association 15.75 11.89 18.80 0.00 311.01
Arson 223.35 151.42 220.53 11.94 1850.34
Drugs 529.36 484.69 241.69 43.54 2043.58
Prostitution 23.67 19.15 19.44 0.00 153.24
Fraud 1771.21 1692.65 598.17 189.06 4775.84
Usury 6.48 5.09 6.41 0.00 77.63
Criminal attack 7.69 5.60 9.22 0.00 117.26
Threat 1481.11 1408.44 503.59 0.00 3842.53
Damage 5719.02 5056.42 2842.88 612.95 25,310.09
Money laundering 20.01 14.13 21.54 0.00 284.25
Corruption 4.78 3.46 5.67 0.00 44.38
1 3
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central provinces of Italy, we observe that only two mafia-type criminal activities 
(i.e., mafia association and assets dissolved) are correlated with each other. On the 
other hand, mafia-type criminal activities are correlated with each other and with 
other variables in the southern regions. This result could be attributed to the fact 
that, while in the southern part of Italy, the power of mafias resides in their control 
and exploitation of territory and community, criminal groups modify their behaviors 
and modi operandi when operating outside their territory of origin. In particular, 
mafia clans use their immense assets to infiltrate the legitimate economy and to con-
trol illegal markets such as large-scale drug trafficking, prostitution and goods coun-
terfeiting (Europol 2013). Furthermore, the types of illegal activities in which crimi-
nal groups are engaged and its intensity can vary across provinces and time for other 
reasons such changing of the local economic structure (Lavezzi 2008), the spread 
of anti-mafia values in the population (Battisti et al. 2018) or the implementation of 
new crime prevention and control strategies delivered by law enforcement agencies 
and the courts (UNODC 2010).
Overall, based on the variation in correlation coefficients among crime variables 
across geographical clusters, the construction of the organized crime index should 
not be based merely on correlation coefficients (see e.g., Calderoni 2011) and factor 
analysis (see e.g., Dugato et  al. 2020). Hence, rather than relying on the correla-
tion or factor analysis to determine the variables to be used in the construction of 
organized crime index, we obtain seven different organized crime indices based on 
the categorization of variables under different aspects of organized crime. In sum, 
we will use indicators that are clustered into four categories in Table 2 to construct 
organized crime indices. We will also provide three alternative organized crime indi-
ces based on the literature review that considers different sets of variables in their 
construction. Firstly, we use four types of mafia-related criminal activities (see e.g., 
Calderoni 2011; Dugato et al. 2020). Secondly, we use four types of mafia-related 
criminal activities and also include extortion, criminal association, arson and kid-
napping variables (see e.g., Mennella 2011; Daniele and Marani 2011). Thirdly, we 
use four types of mafia-related criminal activities, and also include extortion, arson, 
usury, money-laundering, drug-trafficking and corruption since the last four types of 
criminal offenses have been proposed in the recent literature (Caglayan et al. 2018; 
Dugato et al. 2020; Neanidis et al. 2017). Hence, overall, we will examine the sen-
sitivity of organized crime based on different indicator choices and as well as the 
weights attached to these indicators.
2.3  Normalization procedure
Since crime indicators are measured in different units (e.g., total assets confiscated 
due to crime or number of criminal activity) and each variable measures a differ-
ent type of crime not comparable with others, we first normalize indicators before 
aggregation.
There are numerous methods of normalization such as standardization (or z-scores), 
rescaling (or min–max), and distance to reference points, and one can choose a spe-
cific normalization procedure depending on the problem at hand (see OECD 2008 
for further discussion on the benefits and disadvantages of various normalization 
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procedures). In this paper, we follow a normalization of each variable by assigning 
100 to the province with the highest crime activity in a particular crime indicator, 
while other provinces’ scores are calculated as a percentage to the province with the 
highest crime activity for each type of crime variable (see OECD (2008) for the details 
of the normalization used in this paper and Environmental Performance Index (Wend-
ling et al. 2020) and the Academic Ranking of Worldwide Universities (ARWU) that 
used a similar method to standardize each variable). Therefore, the following formula 





 are normalized and actual crime outcomes in province i for a given 
indicator j at a given time t, respectively. max(Cj) represents the maximum (or highest) 
criminal activity of a given type of crime indicator j during the period of the compari-
son. This normalization procedure allows us to have comparisons across provinces and 
time. To avoid potential effects of large outliers in each indicator, we set the maximum 
value to the 95th percentile of the distribution of a given crime variable.2
2.4  Aggregation methodology
Most of the composite indices are obtained by using weighted averages (see e.g., 
Human Development Index, Multidimensional Poverty Index, and so on). In the 
same lines, both Calderoni (2011) and Dugato et  al. (2014) obtained composite 
organized crime indices by a weighted average of various types of criminal activity. 
On the other hand, most of the empirical papers that examine the effect of organ-
ized crime on different socio-economic characteristics also rely on aggregating dif-
ferent types of organized crime (see e.g., Daniele and Marani 2011; Neanidis et al. 
2017 among many others), suggesting that either different types of criminal activ-
ity are assigned equal importance or different crime variables are assigned weights 
based on factor analysis (see e.g., Caglayan et al. 2018; Dugato et al. 2020). In sum, 
different types of normalized crime indicators are aggregated to obtain organized 
crime index (OCI) for all provinces as follows:
where wj is the weight attached to a given type of crime variable j, ctij is the normal-
ized crime indicator j for province i at time t.
The choice of weights depends on the importance attached to the particular type 
of crime by policymakers and/or researchers based on normative judgment or data-





















2 In other words, the maximum criminal activity of given type of crime indicator j during the period of 
the comparison is taken as the 95th percentile of the distribution where the crime levels above this per-
centile is allocated a value of 100.
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type of crime, the previous literature obtained organized crime indices by summing 
different crime variables or using equally-weighted averages of normalized crime indi-
cators. Daniele and Marani (2011), for example, construct an organized crime as the 
sum of extortion, bomb attacks, arson and crimes of criminal association per 10,000 
inhabitants. Moreover, they use other types of crime as control variables: the number 
of crimes against property, thefts and robberies. Neanidis et al. (2017) study the inter-
actions between organized crime and corruption where they obtain an organized crime 
index by summing five types of variables: the number of criminal association, mafia 
association, homicides by the mafia, extortion, and bomb attacks. According to the 
second way of constructing an organized crime index, Calderoni (2011) and Dugato 
et al. (2014) first normalize each set of variables and then aggregate them by using 
equal weights. However, both of these two approaches assume that different concepts 
of organized crime (e.g., criminal association and arson type of criminal offense) to be 
equally-contributing to organized crime, something that may not be the case.
Hence, in this paper, rather than relying on a subjective allocation of weights 
to each factor contributing to organized crime, we apply SDE, a data-driven 
methodology, to obtain a combination of different factors that lead to higher and 
lower measured organized crime across Italian provinces when compared to the 
equally-weighted benchmark index. The construction of two extreme scenar-
ios will enable the policymakers to examine the sensitivity of organized crime 
indices based on the alternative importance attached to crime variables. Fur-
thermore, a combination of factors that leads to the highest (lowest) measured 
organized crime would enable one to highlight the factors that are more (less) 
present across different units considered. In other words, indicators contribut-
ing relatively more to the highest measured organized crime index would sug-
gest that these crimes are more present across units and time, and hence would 
require nation-wide policies. However, indicators that contribute relatively more 
towards the lowest measured organized crime index would suggest that these 
organised crimes are observed less frequently and would require local action at 
the units where the criminal activities are observed.
3  SDE methodology
The SDE methodology is a direct extension of pair-wise stochastic dominance 
(SD) methodologies where full diversification is allowed (i.e., comparison of 
weighted organized crime distributions across provinces). Pair-wise SD is used 
to test a set of relations that may hold between distributions (e.g., comparison of 
distributions of two crime indicators across different provinces of Italy). On the 
other hand, in the case of full diversification (i.e., SDE methodology), the com-
posite organized crime levels in Italian provinces with pre-determined weights 
(e.g., the organized crime index obtained with a vector of equal weights), are 
taken as a benchmark and tested against all possible composite indices produced 
with any possible weighting scheme allocated to different crime indicators.
The SDE methodology has become a popular methodology to construct indices 
based on the distribution of the variables. In a related literature in finance, a more 
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general, multivariate problem is that of testing whether a given portfolio is stochas-
tically efficient relative to all mixtures of a discrete set of alternatives (Post 2003; 
Kuosmanen 2004; Roman et al. 2006), while others address this problem with vari-
ous proposed SDE tests (Post and Versijp 2007; Scaillet and Topaloglou 2010; Lin-
ton et al. 2014; Arvanitis and Topaloglou 2017; Fang and Post 2017; Post and Poti 
2017). These SDE tests are used to examine the existence of alternative ways of 
combining assets that dominate the benchmark market or welfare index to obtain 
best- and worst-case scenarios of wellbeing (e.g., Pinar et  al. 2013, 2015, 2017, 
2019; Agliardi et  al. 2015; Pinar 2015; Mehdi 2019) and risk indices (see e.g., 
Agliardi et al. 2012, 2014). For instance, Pinar et al. (2013) used SDE methodology 
to obtain the best-case scenario combination of dimensions of the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI), where a full diversification of weights of HDI dimensions 
were used to obtain the most optimistic measurement of HDI among countries. In 
this paper, we will use the SDE approach to obtain combinations of different types 
of organized crime variables that lead to the highest and lowest measured organ-
ized crime index. We briefly present the formal SDE methodology below on how to 
obtain the weights that lead to the highest measured organized crime (please refer 
to Scaillet and Topaloglou 2010 and Pinar et al. 2013 for a more detailed discussion 
of the SDE methodology). We do not discuss how to obtain weights that lead to the 
lowest measured index to preserve space, but this could be obtained by reversing 
the order of the cumulative distribution functions under consideration.
We consider a m × N matrix of organized crime C taking values in ℝm , where the 
observations consist of a realization of normalized crime levels in m indicators of 
crime with N observations (i.e., organized crime levels in different provinces over 
a given period). We denote by F(y), the continuous cumulative distribution func-
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 with e being a vector of ones suggesting that all crime 
indicators have non-negative weights that sum up to one. Let us denote by G(s, w; 
F) and G(s, wa; F) as cdfs of the composite crime indices of w′C and wa′C at point s 













respectively, where s represents a crime index score,  is an indicator function, and u 
is an increasing monotonic function of such that u′(s) > 0 (see Scaillet and Topaloglou 
2010 for further details).
The general hypotheses for testing the first-order of SDE of the composite organized 
crime index obtained with an equally-weighted vector can be written compactly as:




 for all s ∈ ℝ and for all wa ∈ ,




 for some s ∈ ℝ and for some wa ∈ 
Under the null hypothesis (H0), the distribution of the equally-weighted OCI is not 
bigger in magnitude than any distribution of OCI with alternative weights. Therefore, 





 (i.e., the cumulative distribution of OCI with alternative weights) for all 
organized crime index scores of s. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, this suggests 
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that the equally-weighted OCI has a distribution of composite organized indices that 
produces a higher proportion of provinces that have a score that is above any given 
OCI scores of s. To summarize, under the null, the equally-weighted OCI carries “more 
crime” than any other index with alternative weights.
On the other hand, under the alternative hypothesis (H1), for some index scores, 
s, some provinces’ OCI scores with alternative weights are higher in magnitude than 





 for some index scores and the equally-weighted OCI is stochastically domi-
nated by OCI with alternative weights at some scores. This suggests that the propor-
tion of provinces with OCI scores less than s is smaller for the OCI with alternative 
weights than for the equally-weighted one. Therefore, if the null hypothesis is rejected, 
this suggests that OCI obtained with alternative weights (i.e., wa) would have a higher 
proportion of provinces with OCI scores that are higher than s when compared to the 
equally-weighted OCI.
The empirical counterparts of the both distributions can be obtained as follows:
Given the above-specified empirical counterparts, we consider the weighted Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov type test statistic to test for the null hypothesis:
and a test based on the decision rule:
where z is some critical value (for the derivation of the test, see Scaillet and Topalo-
glu 2010 and Pinar et al. 2013). Since the distribution of the test statistic depends on 
the underlying distribution, we rely on a subsampling bootstrap method adopted by 
Linton et al. (2014). Finally, we obtain the test statistic for the first-order SDE test 
by using a mixed-integer programming formulation (see Sect. 4 of Pinar et al. 2013 
for the derivation of mathematical formulation).
4  Empirical analysis
4.1  Highest and lowest measured organized crime
Using the SDE methodology, we find that the equally-weighted organized crime 
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that there are alternative combinations of different types of crime variables that 
would stochastically dominate the equally-weighted OCI in the first-order sense. 
Panels A to G of Table 4 provide the weight allocations across the crime indicators 
that lead to the highest and lowest organized crime index (HOCI and LOCI hereaf-
ter) outcomes across Italian provinces when different sets of indicators are used to 
construct OCI (see Sect. 2.2 for the detailed choice of indicators for construction of 
OCIs).
When we examine the “criminal conspiracy” dimension (Panel A of Table 4), we 
find that the presence of a criminal association across Italian provinces is relatively 
higher compared to that of a mafia-type association. Drug-related (usury) crimes are 
relatively more (less) present across the Italian provinces [i.e., an indicator that gets 
relatively more weight in the HOCI (LOCI) scenario in Panel B of Table 4)] when 
indicators that are linked with the “provision of illicit goods and services” dimen-
sion are used to construct an index. When we use the indicators listed under the 
“use of violence, threat or intimidation” dimension, we find that threats and mafia 
murders are the indicators that are more and less present across Italian provinces 
(see panel C of Table 4), while fraud activity and councils dissolved due to mafia 
infiltration were more and less present across Italian provinces when the indicators 
in the “infiltration of legitimate business or government” are used (see Panel D of 
Table 4). When mafia-related variables (i.e., mafia murder, mafia-type association, 
councils dissolved due to mafia infiltration and assets confiscated) are considered 
with other sets of variables (see Panels F and G of Table 4), we find that extortion 
and drug-related criminal activities are more present across Italian provinces and 
none of the mafia-related variables contributes to the HOCI. In contrast, councils 
dissolved due to mafia infiltration is the least present crime across Italian provinces 
when mafia-type variables and/or other variables are considered to construct an 
index (see Panels E–G of Table 4). If some indicators have little presence or vari-
ation across the Italian peninsula such as mafia-related crimes, inclusion of these 
indicators with other indicators, when an equally-weighted index or principal com-
ponent analysis is used to obtain indices, would make their contribution to the com-
posite index fairly limited. However, with the use of SDE methodology, these indi-
cators are important as they contribute significantly to obtain the lowest organised 
crime index (lower bound of the feasible range of composite indices). Hence, these 
indicators play a major role in the construction of the feasible range of composite 
organised crime, whereas they would have been otherwise underrepresented with 
the equally-weighted index or with the index obtained with the principal component 
analysis.
Even though the average OCI is highly and positively correlated with the HOCI 
and LOCI for all seven categories, the correlation coefficients between HOCI and 
LOCI are not significantly correlated with one another, or the correlation among 
these two extreme scenarios are relatively weaker (see “Appendix” Table 12), which 
suggests that there are major rank reversals among Italian provinces based on the 
weight choices in the construction of organized crime indices (see “Appendix” 
1 3
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Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 for the average OCI, HOCI and LOCI scores and 
respective rankings in 7 categories in 2014).3
Rank is important for policymakers especially because they want to identify in 
which province intervention is most needed to mitigate or eliminate the negative 
effects of organized crime on socio-economic development. The above-ranking anal-
ysis suggests that the choice of indicators and the weight associated with them leads 
to major reversals in the rankings of provinces producing very different levels of 
intensity of organized crime. Figure 1 provides the distribution of organized crime 
across Italian provinces in 2014 when HOCI and LOCI are used. In these maps, 
darker colors correspond to a wider presence of criminal activity. As expected, 
the presence of the criminal organizations is mostly concentrated in some South-
ern provinces (Naples and Caserta in Campania, Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, 
Crotone and Catanzaro in Calabria, Palermo, Trapani, Agrigento and Caltanissetta 
in Sicily, and Bari and Lecce in Apulia). However, the geographical distribution 
of these indicators varies based on the choice of indicators and weights attached to 
them. Figure 1 also reports the difference between HOCI and LOCI outcomes high-
lighting the extent of the variation in organized crime outcomes when a different set 
of weights are attached to crime indicators.
When the dimension of criminal conspiracy is considered, we observe that 
criminal association is highly diffused within the central-southern provinces 
while Mafia-type association, captured by the LOCI scenario, is clustered mostly 
on the southern side (see Fig. 1a). Although lower and higher scenario differ in 
terms of intensity, we can observe that in both cases the activities related with 
the provision of illicit goods and services are widely diffused among the central-
northern provinces (see Fig.  1b) while the violence, threat or intimidation type 
of crime were more present in the south of Italy (see Fig.  1c). This finding is 
consistent with the fact that mafia’s activities are mainly focused on control and 
exploitation of territory in the South of Italy, while infiltrations of legal econ-
omy and control of illegal markets prevail in the rest of the Peninsula. Figure 1d 
shows results in terms of the infiltration of legitimate business or government. 
The distribution of the HOCI is somewhat ambiguous, but the highest values of 
the LOCI are mostly clustered in the Southern regions where the mafia is his-
torically rooted (e.g., Palermo, Trapani, Siracusa in Sicily and Reggio Calabria, 
Vibo Valentia e Catanzaro in Calabria). When we examine the distributions of the 
three remaining indices that are tailored to measure the presence of four mafia-
type crimes alongside other indicators, we also observe major variation in index 
outcomes when a different set of indicators and weights are used (see panels E to 
3 Clearly, clustering indicators into different themes would affect the results obtained. For robustness, 
we carried out an additional analysis where we included the whole set of indicators (i.e., 17 indicators) 
in the analysis. In this analysis, we found that the fraud, threat, drug, extortion and damage related crimi-
nal activities contribute 46%, 38%, 9%, 4% and 3% to the HOCI, respectively. On the other hand, crime 
variables that measure the number of councils dissolved, mafia murders, assets confiscated, mafia-type 
association, and corruption contribute to the LOCI with the weights of 75%, 7%, 7%, 6% and 5%, respec-
tively. Appendix Tables 20 offers the average OCI, HOCI and LOCI scores and respective rankings when 
17 indicators are used to obtain indices.







Fig. 1  Distribution of organized crime index at provincial level in 2014
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G of Fig. 1). Distribution of the crime index outcomes across the Italian penin-
sula with the LOCI scenario is fully consistent among the three cases depicting a 
clear spatial pattern that unsurprisingly identifies the presence of organized crime 
in the Southern regions. On the contrary, the distribution with the HOCI scenar-
ios varies widely among the three cases since the indicators that make it up and 
their weights change. When four mafia-type crime variables are considered (panel 
E of Table 4), we observe that the criminal activity in the central and northern 
regions was rarely observed irrespective of the weights attached to the indicators. 
The index shows very limited variation between HOCI and LOCI when only four 
indicators are considered; however, when the other indicators are included in the 
four mafia-type crimes, the variation across HOCI and LOCI is extremely high. 
The inclusion of additional indicators to the index leads to a more homogeneous 
distribution across the Italian peninsula with the equally weighted index, suggest-
ing that including additional indicators to these four mafia-type crimes blurs the 
region-specific crime activities. However, obtaining two extreme scenarios ena-
bles one to highlight such cases.
To conclude the discussion, Fig. 1 includes additional maps for each case that pro-
vide the difference between the two extreme scenarios. In particular, darker colors 
correspond to the case in which the score of HOCI is greater than the LOCI while 
transparent colors present the opposite scenario. In general, we observe that the aver-
age variation across these two extreme scenarios is relatively higher when the indica-
tors in “Use of violence, threat or intimidation” and “Infiltration of legitimate business 
or Government” dimensions are allocated different sets of weights, where the average 
difference per province between the two extreme scenarios is 0.45 and 0.55, respec-
tively. Similarly, when mafia-type crimes are used with other indicators (mafia index-2 
and mafia index-3), allocating alternative weights to indicators leads to major index 
outcome differences. Finally, the variation between HOCI and LOCI scenarios is 
(f)
(g)
Fig. 1  (continued)
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relatively lower when the indicators in “criminal conspiracy” and “provision of illicit 
goods and services” dimensions are combined with alternative weights and when four 
mafia-type crimes are used. In sum, we can argue that the literature using the mafia-
type crimes with other indicators lead to the underestimation of criminal groups in the 
southern regions and indicators that only use the mafia-type crimes (e.g., Calderoni 
2014) underrepresent the criminal groups in North-Central Italy.
4.2  Robustness analysis
In the baseline analysis (Sect. 4.1), we excluded some of the important variables (i.e., bomb-
ing/incendiary attacks, bank/postal robbery, smuggling, track robbery) that are measuring 
important crimes committed by criminal organisations. The reason why these indicators are 
excluded from the analysis is that they lack data for some years and inclusion of these indi-
cators with the others would limit the number of observations in our analysis as the SDE 
methodology requires a balanced data set. However, to test the robustness of our baseline 
analysis, we examine the role of the four additional indicators for the HOCI and LOCI when 
each variable (i.e., bombing/incendiary attacks, bank/postal robbery, smuggling, track rob-
bery) is included to the indicator list one at a time with the existing other indicators.
The “bombing or incendiary attacks” variable is not available after 2003, so we repeated 
the exercise by using variables that has information between 1991 and 2003, and this varia-
ble does not contribute neither to the HOCI nor LOCI. Henceforth, its exclusion from anal-
ysis does not affect the feasible range of organised crime index.4 With respect to other indi-
cators, there is data for the “bank/postal robbery” and “smuggling” variables for the period 
between 2008 and 2014, and for the “track robbery” between 2010 and 2014. Henceforth, 
we carried out two sets of analysis: (1) analysis with 19 variables when the “bank/postal 
robbery” and “smuggling” variables are part of the analysis with the remaining 17 vari-
ables, which covers the period between 2008 and 2014 and (2) analysis with 20 variables 
when the “bank/postal robbery”, “smuggling” and “track robbery” variables are part of the 
analysis with the remaining 17 variables, which covers the period between 2010 and 2014.
For the analysis for the period between 2008 and 2014 with the 19 variables, we 
find that the fraud, threat, drug and damage related crimes contribute to the HOCI 
with weights of 52%, 32%, 12% and 4%, respectively. Whereas, crimes variables that 
measure the number of councils dissolved, mafia murders, mafia type association, 
assets confiscated and smuggling contribute to the LOCI with weights of 72%, 9%, 
7%, 6% and 6%, respectively. On the other hand, when we use 20 variables in our anal-
ysis when the period between 2010 and 2014 are considered, we find that fraud, threat, 
drug and damage related crimes contribute to the HOCI with weights of 48%, 38%, 
10%, and 4%, respectively, and crimes variables that measure the number of councils 
dissolved, mafia murders, mafia type association, assets confiscated and smuggling 
contribute to the LOCI with weights of 75%, 7%, 6%, 7% and 5%, respectively.
Overall, our findings suggest that our results are mostly robust to the inclusion of 
the four type of crime variables (i.e., bombing/incendiary attacks, bank/postal robbery, 
smuggling, track robbery) to the analysis as their inclusion does not affect the calculation 
of the HOCI and LOCI with one exception. The only exception is that the smuggling 
4 The results are available from authors upon request.
1 3
European Journal of Law and Economics 
variable contributes to the calculation of the LOCI suggesting that the inclusion of smug-
gling to obtain the least organised crime index is needed but the contribution of smug-
gling to the LOCI is relatively lower compared to the contribution of other indicators.
4.3  Sensitivity of organized crime indices and its implications for socio‑economic 
development
HOCI and LOCI provide a feasible range of organised crime variable outcome for 
Italian provinces. Therefore, irrespective of the weight (importance) given to differ-
ent crime indicators, one can assess the range of organised crime outcome of a given 
province. Furthermore, another important aspect for policymakers would be to assess 
whether a correlation between organised crime and socioeconomic factors based on 
the two extreme cases of measuring organised crime (lowest and highest organised 
crime distribution across Italian provinces irrespective of the importance given to the 
indicators) would exist. Hence, in this subsection, we further examine whether differ-
ent ways of measuring organized crime have any particular effects on the socio-eco-
nomic variables. To examine the relationship between organized crime and socio-eco-
nomic variables, we use a different set of socio-economic factors. Table 5 provides the 
list of socio-economic indicators used and their source and descriptive statistics, and 
the latest year availability of the variables. We use measures of institutional quality 
indices for Italian provinces (corruption, government, role of law, regulatory and insti-
tutional quality index) Nifo and Vecchione (2014), where a higher index score repre-
sents a better institutional setting. We also use the percentage of the population with 
secondary and tertiary education levels, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, the 
natural logarithm of value-added per worker as a proxy for productivity differences, 
which are obtained from the European Regional Database (ERD). Finally, we also use 
different indexes of social mobility from Acciari et al. (2017) where higher scores rep-
resent more chances of social mobility.
Table  6 shows that the correlation coefficients between socio-economic indicators 
and OC indexes are generally very strong and with the expected sign. In line with the 
previous literature, the correlation coefficients of organized crime and institutional qual-
ity index, social mobility, productivity and income are negative suggesting that organ-
ized crime is a limit to local development. The education level of the province is also 
negatively associated with organized crime index but does not show a strong correla-
tion. Looking at the results in more detail, we can see that index 2 that measures the 
provision of illicit goods and services does not show a strong and significant correlation 
with socio-economic statistics irrespective of the weights given to each indicator in this 
dimension. We also find that when HOCI-4 and HOCI-7 are used to measure organized 
crime across Italian provinces, the correlation coefficients between organized crime indi-
ces and most of the socio-economic indicators are not significant. Overall, even though 
most of the organized crime indices (i.e., 16 out of 21 indices presented in Table 6) have 
a negative correlation with socio-economic indicators irrespective of the indicator choice 
and weights attached to them, there are also few exceptions (5 out of 21 indices) where 
the correlation between organized crime index and socioeconomic factors is not signifi-
cant. In conclusion, irrespective of the importance (weight) given to the crime indicators 
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that leads to lowest and highest organised crime distribution across Italian provinces, the 
analysis in this section showed that organised crime is significantly and negatively cor-
related with the socioeconomic factors irrespective of the importance (weight) given to 
individual indicators. Hence, policymakers could be reassured that irrespective of the 
importance (weight) attached to indicators to construct an overall organised crime index, 
organised crime results in negative the socioeconomic outcomes.
5  Conclusion and policy discussions
There is an extensive literature that studies the effects of organized crime on insti-
tutional quality, economic growth, and performance of firms, among many other 
socio-economic conditions. However, the definition and the use of organized crime 
differ as there is no consensus on which variables should be considered as part of the 
organized crime index and their relative importance in the construction of such an 
index. In this paper, we aim at identifying a broad set of organized crime indices and 
provide a sensitivity analysis of organized crime across the Italian provinces based 
on the choice of indicators and the weights given to these indicators. Following the 
definition of organized crime provided UNODC, indices (1)–(4) are built to cluster 
the main categories of illegal behaviors connected to different categories of criminal 
activity. Indices 5–7, instead, are tailored to measure the presence and sensitivity of 
the major mafia-type criminality, which is historically rooted in Italy, based on the 
set of indicators that are closely associated with such criminal activities. We then 
provide the distribution of organized crime index outcomes across the Italian prov-
inces based on the different sets of indicators and weight choices, which also enables 
us to examine the level of sensitivity of organized crime to these choices. We find 
that both the rankings and the intensity of organized crime vary dramatically when 
different indicators are used to construct organized crime indices and when these 
indicators are given different weights. Hence, our findings highlight the sensitivity 
of organized crime indices on normative judgments, and as such that one should be 
cautious while making decisions based on these indices.
With the use of SDE methodology, we obtain two extreme case scenarios that provide 
weighting vectors that lead to the highest and lowest measured organized crime indi-
ces (HOCI and LOCI, respectively). From one side, the HOCI scenario allowed us to 
group a set of crime types that were observed more frequently across provinces and time 
that would require nation-wide policies. On the other side, the LOCI scenario takes into 
consideration indicators that occur less frequently and are extremely concentrated in a 
limited number of provinces allowing a good measure of the presence of criminal organ-
izations that are historically rooted in southern Italy. Our results suggest the need for 
diversified strategies among Italian provinces to fight criminal organizations in a more 
effective way. In particular, in North-Central Italian provinces, there is the need to iden-
tify specific law enforcement policies to fight drug trafficking, prostitution and money 
laundering. However, the strategy in southern provinces must be aimed at the traditional 
mafia’s activities. Indicators that were more frequently observed across Italian provinces 
(e.g., drug-related crime, extortions, kidnapping) require more nation-wide policies.
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Our results could provide guidance for policymaking. First, policymakers should be 
aware that the distribution of organised crime spatially and over-time would depend on the 
choice of the indicators used to obtain an organised crime index and the importance (weight) 
attached to each one of them. To overcome such uncertainty, this paper offers a feasible 
range of organised crime index in provinces irrespective of the weight attached to them. 
Policymakers may also choose to allocate their limited resources to fight against organised 
crime where provinces in which there is a higher presence of organised crime are prioritised. 
As such, the ranking of provinces in terms of their organised crime activity is also impor-
tant. Our paper offers rankings of provinces based on the presence of organised crime for 
two extreme scenario and policymakers could identify high ranking provinces irrespective 
of measurement issues. In other words, provinces that are ranked in high positions would be 
prioritised as high crime provinces irrespective of subjective indicator and weight choices.
Finally, we examine the correlation between organised crime indices and several 
socio-economic indicators. We find that in provinces where organized crime levels are 
higher tend to do worse socio-economically with most of the organized crime indices 
constructed in this paper irrespective of the indicator choice and importance attached to 
these indicators. However, there were also few exceptions where organized crime levels 
were not significantly correlated with the socio-economic factors based on the indicator 
choice (i.e., all indices constructed with the use of drug, prostitution, and usury related 
crimes). This highlights the fact that empirical literature examining the relationship 
between organized crime and some socio-economic concepts should be cautious about 
the robustness of their findings and should require additional checks with the use of dif-
ferent organized crime indicators and alternative aggregation methods.
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Table 8  Categorization of the Italian provinces into different groups
Province Location Province Location Province Location
Agrigento Southern Gorizia Northern Ragusa Southern
Alessandria Northern Grosseto Central Ravenna Northern
Ancona Central Imperia Northern Reggio di Calabria Southern
Aosta Northern Isernia Southern Reggio Emilia Northern
Arezzo Central La Spezia Northern Rieti Central
Ascoli Piceno Central L’Aquila Southern Rimini Northern
Asti Northern Latina Central Roma Central
Avellino Southern Lecce Southern Rovigo Northern
Bari Southern Lecco Northern Salerno Southern
Belluno Northern Livorno Central Sassari Southern
Benevento Southern Lodi Northern Savona Northern
Bergamo Northern Lucca Central Siena Central
Biella Northern Macerata Central Siracusa Southern
Bologna Northern Mantova Northern Sondrio Northern
Bolzano Northern Massa and Carrara Central Taranto Southern
Brescia Northern Matera Southern Teramo Southern
Brindisi Southern Messina Southern Terni Central
Cagliari Southern Milano Northern Torino Northern
Caltanissetta Southern Modena Northern Trapani Southern
Campobasso Southern Napoli Southern Trento Northern
Caserta Southern Novara Northern Treviso Northern
Catania Southern Nuoro Southern Trieste Northern
Catanzaro Southern Oristano Southern Udine Northern
Chieti Southern Padova Northern Varese Northern
Como Northern Palermo Southern Venezia Northern
Cosenza Southern Parma Northern Verbano-Cusio-Ossola Northern
Cremona Northern Pavia Northern Vercelli Northern
Crotone Southern Perugia Central Verona Northern
Cuneo Northern Pesaro and Urbino Central Vibo Valentia Southern
Enna Southern Pescara Southern Vicenza Northern
Ferrara Northern Piacenza Northern Viterbo Central
Firenze Central Pisa Central
Foggia Southern Pistoia Central
Forlì_Cesena Northern Pordenone Northern
Frosinone Central Potenza Southern
Genova Northern Prato Central
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Table 13  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 1
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 21.81 43.18 0.87 27 17 31
Abruzzo L’Aquila 8.00 15.84 0.32 65 65 65
Abruzzo Pescara 15.22 30.14 0.61 42 36 44
Abruzzo Teramo 7.89 15.62 0.32 66 66 66
Basilicata Matera 18.30 36.23 0.73 33 27 37
Basilicata Potenza 25.78 19.64 31.80 24 56 14
Calabria Catanzaro 46.94 60.39 33.77 15 11 13
Calabria Cosenza 13.64 27.01 0.55 44 38 46
Calabria Crotone 49.33 97.68 1.97 12 7 26
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 96.02 92.13 99.84 1 9 1
Calabria Vibo Valentia 15.02 29.73 0.60 43 37 45
Campania Avellino 11.41 22.58 0.46 55 50 55
Campania Benevento 50.00 99.00 2.00 8 3 22
Campania Caserta 37.02 47.63 26.63 18 14 16
Campania Napoli 61.78 42.75 80.41 6 19 4
Campania Salerno 46.05 16.15 75.34 16 64 6
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 13.48 26.69 0.54 47 40 48
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 6.91 13.68 0.28 70 70 70
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 6.19 12.25 0.25 71 71 71
Emilia-Romagna Modena 1.75 3.47 0.07 90 90 90
Emilia-Romagna Parma 2.77 5.48 0.11 86 86 86
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 12.51 24.76 0.50 49 43 50
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 4.59 9.09 0.18 75 75 75
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 3.67 7.27 0.15 79 79 79
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 11.70 23.16 0.47 52 46 52
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 9.12 18.06 0.36 62 59 62
Lazio Frosinone 22.19 43.93 0.89 26 16 30
Lazio Latina 17.23 34.11 0.69 34 28 38
Lazio Rieti 15.37 30.43 0.61 41 35 43
Lazio Roma 12.47 21.95 3.18 50 52 21
Lazio Viterbo 7.62 15.08 0.30 69 69 69
Liguria Genova 11.31 22.39 0.45 56 51 56
Liguria Imperia 16.91 33.47 0.68 36 31 39
Liguria La Spezia 11.03 21.85 0.44 57 53 57
Liguria Savona 4.32 8.56 0.17 77 77 77
Lombardia Bergamo 8.86 17.55 0.35 64 61 64
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Table 13  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 5.83 11.55 0.23 72 72 72
Lombardia Como 4.10 8.11 0.16 78 78 78
Lombardia Cremona 13.55 26.83 0.54 45 39 47
Lombardia Lecco 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Lombardia Lodi 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Lombardia Mantova 2.96 5.85 0.12 84 84 84
Lombardia Milano 15.39 23.02 7.92 40 47 20
Lombardia Pavia 2.24 4.43 0.09 88 88 88
Lombardia Sondrio 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Lombardia Varese 9.67 19.15 0.39 61 58 61
Marche Ancona 50.00 99.00 2.00 8 3 22
Marche Ascoli Piceno 11.59 22.94 0.46 53 48 53
Marche Macerata 19.09 37.80 0.76 31 24 35
Marche Pesaro Urbino 3.37 6.67 0.13 82 82 82
Molise Campobasso 16.18 32.03 0.65 39 34 42
Molise Isernia 28.12 55.68 1.12 23 12 29
Piemonte Alessandria 19.79 39.18 0.79 30 23 34
Piemonte Asti 44.21 33.67 54.53 17 30 8
Piemonte Biella 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Piemonte Cuneo 2.07 4.10 0.08 89 89 89
Piemonte Novara 16.50 32.68 0.66 38 33 41
Piemonte Torino 17.01 23.36 10.78 35 45 18
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Piemonte Vercelli 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Puglia Bari 13.54 17.42 9.74 46 62 19
Puglia Brindisi 63.48 37.19 89.23 5 25 2
Puglia Foggia 11.59 22.94 0.46 54 49 54
Puglia Lecce 87.44 99.75 75.39 2 1 5
Puglia Taranto 67.98 54.32 81.37 4 13 3
Sardegna Cagliari 4.37 8.66 0.17 76 76 76
Sardegna Nuoro 7.72 15.28 0.31 68 68 68
Sardegna Oristano 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Sardegna Sassari 3.66 7.25 0.15 80 80 80
Sicilia Agrigento 49.20 97.42 1.97 13 8 27
Sicilia Caltanissetta 72.00 99.44 45.13 3 2 10
Sicilia Catania 49.08 44.08 53.98 14 15 9
Sicilia Enna 56.39 42.96 69.56 7 18 7
Sicilia Messina 35.68 34.09 37.23 19 29 12
Sicilia Palermo 30.64 42.08 19.42 22 20 17
Sicilia Ragusa 50.00 99.00 2.00 8 3 22
Sicilia Siracusa 9.09 18.00 0.36 63 60 63
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Table 13  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 22.30 16.99 27.50 25 63 15
Toscana Arezzo 10.62 21.02 0.42 58 54 58
Toscana Firenze 13.40 26.53 0.54 48 41 49
Toscana Grosseto 5.45 10.79 0.22 74 74 74
Toscana Livorno 3.60 7.13 0.14 81 81 81
Toscana Lucca 3.11 6.16 0.12 83 83 83
Toscana Massa Carrara 12.25 24.25 0.49 51 44 51
Toscana Pisa 2.92 5.78 0.12 85 85 85
Toscana Pistoia 33.33 25.39 41.11 20 42 11
Toscana Prato 9.69 19.18 0.39 60 57 60
Toscana Siena 50.00 99.00 2.00 8 3 22
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 16.65 32.97 0.67 37 32 40
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 2.29 4.53 0.09 87 87 87
Umbria Perugia 20.29 40.17 0.81 28 21 32
Umbria Terni 31.79 62.95 1.27 21 10 28
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Veneto Belluno 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 92 92
Veneto Padova 7.86 15.57 0.31 67 67 67
Veneto Rovigo 20.11 39.81 0.80 29 22 33
Veneto Treviso 1.38 2.74 0.06 91 91 91
Veneto Venezia 10.01 19.82 0.40 59 55 59
Veneto Verona 18.63 36.89 0.75 32 26 36
Veneto Vicenza 5.64 11.17 0.23 73 73 73
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 14  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 2
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 32.38 26.37 47.69 68 95 24
Abruzzo L’Aquila 40.01 47.61 37.01 50 49 42
Abruzzo Pescara 80.31 76.02 85.70 1 10 4
Abruzzo Teramo 42.94 56.91 36.80 45 33 43
Basilicata Matera 10.82 30.83 0.97 103 89 103
Basilicata Potenza 59.50 33.99 86.79 8 84 2
Calabria Catanzaro 42.84 56.20 42.59 46 34 30
Calabria Cosenza 35.82 44.55 40.65 57 58 33
Calabria Crotone 48.83 52.30 39.31 24 40 37
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 43.30 50.04 46.25 42 43 26
Calabria Vibo Valentia 34.33 35.50 34.45 61 83 47
Campania Avellino 55.67 24.62 86.15 14 97 3
Campania Benevento 45.76 40.12 54.92 35 69 20
Campania Caserta 44.44 45.49 47.02 39 57 25
Campania Napoli 48.16 58.59 53.83 28 29 21
Campania Salerno 45.26 35.70 62.05 38 82 14
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 58.72 68.89 55.82 10 19 19
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 33.09 42.48 21.89 65 61 71
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 71.28 40.67 93.06 2 65 1
Emilia-Romagna Modena 38.49 46.42 38.20 54 52 40
Emilia-Romagna Parma 46.58 46.07 70.75 33 54 10
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 25.38 31.31 21.15 83 87 75
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 70.85 95.53 35.00 3 4 46
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 49.75 40.56 79.26 22 67 7
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 65.90 64.97 76.86 5 22 9
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 19.76 21.36 8.55 96 100 96
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 31.80 18.61 56.87 70 103 17
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 58.86 52.47 40.98 9 39 32
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 20.85 30.73 19.15 94 90 81
Lazio Frosinone 57.58 40.01 79.86 12 70 6
Lazio Latina 58.52 61.82 64.31 11 27 12
Lazio Rieti 29.24 40.13 30.73 75 68 54
Lazio Roma 62.21 97.06 39.36 7 1 36
Lazio Viterbo 46.67 80.99 24.05 32 7 66
Liguria Genova 45.38 72.92 29.53 36 13 59
Liguria Imperia 52.91 96.44 29.76 17 3 58
Liguria La Spezia 50.09 58.54 49.16 21 31 23
Liguria Savona 25.99 55.57 17.03 82 36 84
Lombardia Bergamo 32.17 40.66 32.69 69 66 50
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Table 14  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 43.73 65.53 32.85 40 21 49
Lombardia Como 17.98 37.51 4.28 100 79 99
Lombardia Cremona 23.37 38.49 16.25 91 77 86
Lombardia Lecco 19.55 25.83 16.79 98 96 85
Lombardia Lodi 23.79 37.70 21.73 90 78 72
Lombardia Mantova 29.04 24.23 44.31 76 98 29
Lombardia Milano 46.98 72.85 35.89 30 14 44
Lombardia Pavia 26.99 36.77 21.70 81 80 73
Lombardia Sondrio 33.35 39.22 31.08 64 71 53
Lombardia Varese 33.78 71.84 11.32 62 17 90
Marche Ancona 67.91 63.92 57.50 4 23 16
Marche Ascoli Piceno 40.40 49.99 46.01 49 44 27
Marche Macerata 39.39 75.45 20.48 53 11 78
Marche Pesaro Urbino 25.13 39.15 17.20 84 72 82
Molise Campobasso 19.73 33.12 20.10 97 86 79
Molise Isernia 48.92 47.42 77.40 23 50 8
Piemonte Alessandria 62.38 46.01 60.17 6 55 15
Piemonte Asti 34.46 30.95 16.12 60 88 87
Piemonte Biella 30.27 50.20 9.71 73 42 94
Piemonte Cuneo 28.56 33.67 17.13 77 85 83
Piemonte Novara 20.79 28.30 7.87 95 93 97
Piemonte Torino 31.23 47.24 20.50 71 51 77
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
45.28 65.94 35.82 37 20 45
Piemonte Vercelli 17.53 40.68 3.37 101 64 101
Puglia Bari 34.93 52.93 22.16 59 38 69
Puglia Brindisi 32.95 63.66 24.52 66 25 65
Puglia Foggia 29.25 46.12 19.76 74 53 80
Puglia Lecce 53.92 55.59 66.78 15 35 11
Puglia Taranto 43.12 48.29 39.68 43 46 35
Sardegna Cagliari 48.09 79.06 38.03 29 8 41
Sardegna Nuoro 35.35 57.37 31.40 58 32 52
Sardegna Oristano 28.34 38.59 29.99 78 76 57
Sardegna Sassari 48.19 91.26 32.07 27 5 51
Sicilia Agrigento 40.65 39.00 53.64 48 74 22
Sicilia Caltanissetta 25.08 23.60 11.52 85 99 89
Sicilia Catania 46.82 53.04 42.38 31 37 31
Sicilia Enna 31.08 39.04 30.66 72 73 55
Sicilia Messina 24.87 36.43 23.49 86 81 68
Sicilia Palermo 32.70 45.79 22.00 67 56 70
Sicilia Ragusa 42.23 52.19 26.90 47 41 61
Sicilia Siracusa 46.24 72.54 38.98 34 15 38
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Table 14  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 21.72 42.32 12.97 93 62 88
Toscana Arezzo 52.17 76.62 27.74 19 9 60
Toscana Firenze 33.77 73.08 10.65 63 12 92
Toscana Grosseto 51.14 61.13 62.99 20 28 13
Toscana Livorno 37.08 71.87 9.88 56 16 93
Toscana Lucca 27.45 43.28 25.21 79 60 63
Toscana Massa Carrara 22.40 63.84 2.02 92 24 102
Toscana Pisa 55.76 70.56 44.62 13 18 28
Toscana Pistoia 39.96 44.07 38.71 51 59 39
Toscana Prato 53.02 96.63 40.21 16 2 34
Toscana Siena 27.45 28.48 23.74 80 92 67
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 18.02 38.60 4.09 99 75 100
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 24.56 48.52 6.36 87 45 98
Umbria Perugia 48.70 63.21 33.23 25 26 48
Umbria Terni 43.46 58.57 30.16 41 30 56
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 48.21 47.89 21.66 26 48 74
Veneto Belluno 24.13 27.99 25.12 88 94 64
Veneto Padova 43.05 86.55 20.97 44 6 76
Veneto Rovigo 23.87 20.86 11.28 89 101 91
Veneto Treviso 15.05 20.31 9.28 102 102 95
Veneto Venezia 38.18 48.26 26.18 55 47 62
Veneto Verona 52.66 42.03 80.85 18 63 5
Veneto Vicenza 39.88 28.67 56.27 52 91 18
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 15  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 3
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 30.59 55.97 7.69 76 61 74
Abruzzo L’Aquila 32.62 53.04 7.41 66 69 79
Abruzzo Pescara 46.24 78.96 12.42 19 14 34
Abruzzo Teramo 32.56 60.34 6.28 67 43 87
Basilicata Matera 32.48 48.38 8.90 69 86 65
Basilicata Potenza 44.26 81.10 9.03 27 10 63
Calabria Catanzaro 59.38 93.13 45.95 4 5 4
Calabria Cosenza 48.36 77.96 9.60 13 16 55
Calabria Crotone 53.80 59.01 78.05 9 50 1
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 62.45 67.41 56.42 1 28 3
Calabria Vibo Valentia 44.46 93.69 9.63 26 3 53
Campania Avellino 35.86 79.14 5.26 52 13 96
Campania Benevento 57.26 65.80 14.95 5 33 19
Campania Caserta 53.94 50.19 36.18 8 78 6
Campania Napoli 54.91 57.25 75.74 7 54 2
Campania Salerno 46.33 78.77 7.76 17 15 71
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 44.22 67.54 11.80 28 27 36
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 27.04 65.79 7.64 84 34 76
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 37.00 54.60 9.63 49 65 54
Emilia-Romagna Modena 25.11 45.67 10.06 91 89 50
Emilia-Romagna Parma 36.60 64.67 10.82 50 37 42
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 37.06 41.73 14.87 48 96 20
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 49.64 74.38 13.91 11 20 22
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 30.90 56.51 8.84 74 59 67
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 43.90 66.02 10.48 29 31 46
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 16.73 50.49 5.56 102 77 94
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 23.34 35.46 3.54 93 99 103
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 35.70 61.84 10.40 53 41 47
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 19.18 31.70 7.12 99 102 80
Lazio Frosinone 37.34 70.60 6.80 46 25 83
Lazio Latina 44.85 73.04 9.75 25 21 52
Lazio Rieti 29.92 60.30 5.88 77 45 90
Lazio Roma 38.60 48.52 12.74 42 85 30
Lazio Viterbo 38.57 53.13 9.57 43 68 56
Liguria Genova 40.08 49.67 20.04 41 79 10
Liguria Imperia 45.90 90.70 11.18 20 7 40
Liguria La Spezia 30.73 45.00 10.75 75 90 43
Liguria Savona 41.66 72.10 13.40 36 23 25
Lombardia Bergamo 34.24 56.76 10.86 59 58 41
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Table 15  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 33.32 59.30 11.27 63 48 39
Lombardia Como 25.55 34.85 5.74 90 100 92
Lombardia Cremona 40.62 61.93 13.12 40 40 27
Lombardia Lecco 26.03 48.58 8.91 89 84 64
Lombardia Lodi 32.54 51.09 10.72 68 73 44
Lombardia Mantova 34.08 43.57 7.66 61 94 75
Lombardia Milano 45.35 60.01 17.69 22 46 13
Lombardia Pavia 32.70 58.69 13.58 65 52 24
Lombardia Sondrio 31.19 50.69 7.94 71 75 69
Lombardia Varese 37.55 52.90 13.35 45 71 26
Marche Ancona 30.96 48.80 9.08 73 83 61
Marche Ascoli Piceno 21.49 49.31 5.62 97 81 93
Marche Macerata 33.72 52.98 6.63 62 70 84
Marche Pesaro Urbino 26.47 46.52 5.19 86 88 97
Molise Campobasso 26.04 43.95 6.86 88 93 82
Molise Isernia 59.99 82.69 14.51 3 9 21
Piemonte Alessandria 34.80 56.91 11.31 57 55 38
Piemonte Asti 34.42 55.02 11.75 58 64 37
Piemonte Biella 40.90 93.54 9.83 39 4 51
Piemonte Cuneo 21.35 42.98 6.87 98 95 81
Piemonte Novara 50.73 80.40 18.37 10 11 12
Piemonte Torino 43.39 64.74 19.50 30 36 11
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
35.67 73.02 7.70 54 22 73
Piemonte Vercelli 43.25 67.04 16.93 31 30 15
Puglia Bari 55.31 65.96 32.50 6 32 7
Puglia Brindisi 46.99 62.27 12.38 16 39 35
Puglia Foggia 62.00 79.24 30.29 2 12 8
Puglia Lecce 41.51 58.94 8.86 38 51 66
Puglia Taranto 46.31 49.65 12.60 18 80 32
Sardegna Cagliari 44.95 85.78 15.25 24 8 17
Sardegna Nuoro 41.59 93.91 10.71 37 2 45
Sardegna Oristano 23.27 62.98 4.38 94 38 101
Sardegna Sassari 47.30 94.14 12.99 15 1 28
Sicilia Agrigento 35.07 75.28 7.61 55 19 77
Sicilia Caltanissetta 45.06 92.06 9.42 23 6 58
Sicilia Catania 42.50 56.88 26.08 34 56 9
Sicilia Enna 37.25 67.17 4.54 47 29 100
Sicilia Messina 42.17 70.41 10.12 35 26 49
Sicilia Palermo 34.12 59.09 15.23 60 49 18
Sicilia Ragusa 49.06 65.75 44.50 12 35 5
Sicilia Siracusa 42.98 75.37 9.16 32 18 59
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Table 15  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 48.25 77.08 13.65 14 17 23
Toscana Arezzo 29.39 60.32 5.00 79 44 98
Toscana Firenze 36.43 49.05 12.45 51 82 33
Toscana Grosseto 45.36 51.30 17.62 21 72 14
Toscana Livorno 33.21 71.54 9.04 64 24 62
Toscana Lucca 31.16 55.93 7.75 72 62 72
Toscana Massa Carrara 21.94 59.45 6.22 96 47 88
Toscana Pisa 38.07 50.67 12.96 44 76 29
Toscana Pistoia 35.00 56.88 9.53 56 57 57
Toscana Prato 42.71 55.67 15.99 33 63 16
Toscana Siena 28.96 44.29 8.82 80 92 68
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 22.84 33.56 6.30 95 101 86
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 31.25 37.34 12.67 70 97 31
Umbria Perugia 28.00 61.32 6.40 83 42 85
Umbria Terni 24.02 46.63 9.08 92 87 60
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 29.47 58.16 6.09 78 53 89
Veneto Belluno 18.89 50.93 4.22 100 74 102
Veneto Padova 28.53 53.47 10.28 82 66 48
Veneto Rovigo 26.47 53.15 5.77 87 67 91
Veneto Treviso 14.71 27.55 4.55 103 103 99
Veneto Venezia 28.76 56.08 7.88 81 60 70
Veneto Verona 26.88 44.74 7.47 85 91 78
Veneto Vicenza 18.35 36.73 5.51 101 98 95
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 16  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 4
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 29.54 66.30 5.09 42 51 40
Abruzzo L’Aquila 31.35 57.81 5.12 36 83 38
Abruzzo Pescara 28.38 78.64 4.46 46 23 53
Abruzzo Teramo 18.32 57.23 2.96 93 84 87
Basilicata Matera 19.09 53.11 2.86 89 89 91
Basilicata Potenza 18.52 60.31 2.78 92 73 93
Calabria Catanzaro 45.96 67.59 83.89 15 42 7
Calabria Cosenza 32.65 50.37 53.66 29 95 9
Calabria Crotone 29.77 44.92 9.48 41 101 14
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 65.97 88.37 90.87 2 10 3
Calabria Vibo Valentia 57.11 81.70 86.90 5 18 5
Campania Avellino 29.79 72.55 5.07 40 27 41
Campania Benevento 26.84 63.01 4.48 55 62 52
Campania Caserta 68.75 78.67 55.71 1 22 8
Campania Napoli 64.68 94.85 33.48 4 1 12
Campania Salerno 45.07 79.01 41.01 18 21 10
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 27.68 87.60 4.22 49 12 57
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 24.64 64.91 3.70 65 58 72
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 19.83 66.89 2.97 84 46 86
Emilia-Romagna Modena 26.58 67.29 4.08 56 45 62
Emilia-Romagna Parma 24.38 71.31 3.95 67 31 65
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 19.32 57.81 2.90 88 82 90
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 26.21 69.61 4.10 59 36 61
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 18.89 62.15 2.83 91 66 92
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 30.94 88.58 5.03 37 9 42
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 47.13 86.95 7.99 12 15 18
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 17.95 63.31 2.69 96 61 96
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 40.00 90.00 6.00 20 6 26
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 19.78 65.54 3.21 85 55 78
Lazio Frosinone 31.60 62.68 5.39 33 65 33
Lazio Latina 28.36 64.83 4.75 47 59 46
Lazio Rieti 22.60 46.08 3.80 73 99 71
Lazio Roma 35.38 71.37 5.85 24 29 28
Lazio Viterbo 19.59 61.61 2.94 87 68 89
Liguria Genova 40.72 87.04 6.18 19 14 25
Liguria Imperia 26.53 87.31 3.98 57 13 64
Liguria La Spezia 30.77 66.81 4.62 39 48 50
Liguria Savona 27.07 87.64 4.29 54 11 55
Lombardia Bergamo 22.65 67.37 3.57 72 44 73
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Table 16  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 27.28 59.11 4.30 53 78 54
Lombardia Como 15.15 40.81 2.27 101 102 101
Lombardia Cremona 21.32 67.53 3.20 77 43 79
Lombardia Lecco 17.99 60.26 2.70 95 74 95
Lombardia Lodi 15.10 52.21 2.27 102 90 102
Lombardia Mantova 16.95 55.32 2.54 99 86 99
Lombardia Milano 37.88 90.11 6.21 23 5 23
Lombardia Pavia 21.91 53.82 3.52 74 87 75
Lombardia Sondrio 23.24 71.18 3.84 69 33 66
Lombardia Varese 21.46 60.78 3.37 75 72 76
Marche Ancona 20.31 59.99 3.05 81 75 82
Marche Ascoli Piceno 26.09 66.77 4.22 60 49 56
Marche Macerata 17.06 59.74 2.56 98 76 98
Marche Pesaro Urbino 31.64 49.69 4.92 32 97 45
Molise Campobasso 39.48 68.55 6.78 22 39 22
Molise Isernia 17.45 58.33 2.62 97 80 97
Piemonte Alessandria 30.86 74.94 4.93 38 25 44
Piemonte Asti 20.31 80.70 3.05 82 19 83
Piemonte Biella 19.90 69.58 2.98 83 37 85
Piemonte Cuneo 23.20 51.04 3.81 70 94 69
Piemonte Novara 28.92 84.37 4.69 44 17 49
Piemonte Torino 31.70 88.58 5.40 31 8 32
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
28.06 84.53 4.21 48 16 58
Piemonte Vercelli 31.60 65.11 5.11 34 56 39
Puglia Bari 23.84 59.25 4.18 68 77 60
Puglia Brindisi 47.09 64.99 85.69 13 57 6
Puglia Foggia 55.48 67.63 10.01 6 41 13
Puglia Lecce 25.62 73.69 4.00 63 26 63
Puglia Taranto 22.99 50.16 3.82 71 96 67
Sardegna Cagliari 48.62 89.64 7.75 11 7 20
Sardegna Nuoro 51.18 93.24 8.68 10 2 17
Sardegna Oristano 19.61 48.69 2.94 86 98 88
Sardegna Sassari 46.45 91.87 7.55 14 3 21
Sicilia Agrigento 26.00 45.84 8.76 61 100 16
Sicilia Caltanissetta 31.83 66.84 5.25 30 47 35
Sicilia Catania 45.16 53.17 40.28 17 88 11
Sicilia Enna 26.42 51.63 5.60 58 93 30
Sicilia Messina 27.29 62.83 5.88 52 64 27
Sicilia Palermo 64.87 71.71 93.83 3 28 1
Sicilia Ragusa 28.46 52.18 5.16 45 91 37
Sicilia Siracusa 52.87 65.79 88.32 9 54 4
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Table 16  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 55.40 61.21 92.31 7 71 2
Toscana Arezzo 33.70 61.67 5.62 28 67 29
Toscana Firenze 39.68 67.77 6.21 21 40 24
Toscana Grosseto 29.35 66.62 4.98 43 50 43
Toscana Livorno 34.45 66.15 5.17 27 52 36
Toscana Lucca 20.37 76.53 3.06 80 24 81
Toscana Massa Carrara 27.34 57.91 4.75 51 81 47
Toscana Pisa 27.53 63.58 4.59 50 60 51
Toscana Pistoia 31.35 69.88 4.70 35 35 48
Toscana Prato 54.35 70.71 9.15 8 34 15
Toscana Siena 35.21 69.41 5.28 25 38 34
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 21.08 51.65 3.54 78 92 74
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 24.60 66.10 3.81 66 53 68
Umbria Perugia 15.84 61.53 2.38 100 69 100
Umbria Terni 20.97 71.29 3.15 79 32 80
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 45.21 90.73 7.78 16 4 19
Veneto Belluno 25.91 79.39 4.20 62 20 59
Veneto Padova 18.27 63.01 2.74 94 63 94
Veneto Rovigo 25.36 61.28 3.80 64 70 70
Veneto Treviso 14.26 40.62 2.21 103 103 103
Veneto Venezia 21.32 59.08 3.35 76 79 77
Veneto Verona 34.46 71.35 5.59 26 30 31
Veneto Vicenza 19.00 56.24 3.00 90 85 84
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 17  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 5
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Abruzzo L’Aquila 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Abruzzo Pescara 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Abruzzo Teramo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Basilicata Matera 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Basilicata Potenza 8.01 16.34 0.00 25 20 24
Calabria Catanzaro 44.95 21.74 94.33 7 17 4
Calabria Cosenza 16.82 3.03 58.03 17 27 8
Calabria Crotone 42.90 35.35 7.15 8 12 13
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 77.67 77.17 96.53 1 1 1
Calabria Vibo Valentia 29.77 9.82 92.57 12 21 7
Campania Avellino 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Campania Benevento 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Campania Caserta 52.99 57.54 49.96 6 3 9
Campania Napoli 54.28 50.84 31.84 4 7 12
Campania Salerno 37.83 53.73 38.69 10 5 11
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Modena 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Parma 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lazio Frosinone 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lazio Latina 1.37 2.24 0.16 28 28 21
Lazio Rieti 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lazio Roma 0.88 1.72 0.02 29 29 23
Lazio Viterbo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Liguria Genova 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Liguria Imperia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Liguria La Spezia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Liguria Savona 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Bergamo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
1 3
European Journal of Law and Economics 
Table 17  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Como 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Cremona 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Lecco 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Lodi 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Mantova 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Milano 1.90 3.88 0.00 27 26 24
Lombardia Pavia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Sondrio 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Lombardia Varese 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Marche Ancona 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Marche Ascoli Piceno 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Marche Macerata 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Marche Pesaro Urbino 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Molise Campobasso 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Molise Isernia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Alessandria 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Asti 13.74 28.03 0.00 20 15 24
Piemonte Biella 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Cuneo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Novara 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Torino 4.33 8.15 0.20 26 23 20
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Piemonte Vercelli 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Puglia Bari 10.35 8.52 1.49 23 22 17
Puglia Brindisi 53.39 57.60 92.70 5 2 6
Puglia Foggia 9.12 5.62 1.63 24 25 16
Puglia Lecce 18.72 38.19 0.00 15 11 24
Puglia Taranto 21.80 43.95 0.16 14 8 22
Sardegna Cagliari 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Sardegna Nuoro 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Sardegna Oristano 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Sardegna Sassari 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Sicilia Agrigento 17.35 28.46 2.08 16 14 15
Sicilia Caltanissetta 11.00 22.44 0.00 21 16 24
Sicilia Catania 38.97 42.86 39.77 9 10 10
Sicilia Enna 22.04 43.16 0.54 13 9 19
Sicilia Messina 15.33 28.87 0.72 19 13 18
Sicilia Palermo 58.06 53.47 95.66 2 6 2
Sicilia Ragusa 15.77 7.21 2.96 18 24 14
Sicilia Siracusa 36.54 20.93 93.39 11 19 5
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Table 17  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 56.93 57.14 95.00 3 4 3
Toscana Arezzo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Firenze 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Grosseto 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Livorno 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Lucca 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Massa Carrara 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Pisa 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Pistoia 10.36 21.13 0.00 22 18 24
Toscana Prato 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Toscana Siena 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Umbria Perugia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Umbria Terni 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Belluno 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Padova 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Rovigo 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Treviso 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Venezia 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Verona 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
Veneto Vicenza 0.00 0.00 0.00 30 30 24
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 18  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 6
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 19.86 58.69 2.46 44 47 47
Abruzzo L’Aquila 16.76 54.19 2.25 63 58 58
Abruzzo Pescara 23.59 81.33 2.60 32 10 45
Abruzzo Teramo 18.60 63.22 2.35 50 37 53
Basilicata Matera 20.12 51.89 3.29 41 66 32
Basilicata Potenza 26.68 64.16 3.81 26 34 27
Calabria Catanzaro 54.58 75.43 88.61 4 19 4
Calabria Cosenza 38.76 80.97 56.67 18 11 8
Calabria Crotone 56.99 63.61 14.61 2 35 13
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 73.21 86.97 90.79 1 4 1
Calabria Vibo Valentia 38.77 79.72 84.82 17 13 7
Campania Avellino 20.78 60.69 3.25 40 42 34
Campania Benevento 38.89 88.41 6.40 16 2 17
Campania Caserta 56.28 88.13 50.29 3 3 9
Campania Napoli 53.65 81.94 31.18 5 9 12
Campania Salerno 44.91 83.49 38.68 10 7 11
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 24.72 84.97 2.85 29 5 38
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 10.43 36.76 1.10 91 92 93
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 17.30 60.66 2.08 58 43 62
Emilia-Romagna Modena 9.56 38.17 0.90 94 89 97
Emilia-Romagna Parma 16.21 58.00 2.01 68 50 64
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 12.93 48.67 1.55 86 72 83
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 22.82 74.17 2.94 35 23 37
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 14.16 50.66 1.65 78 70 80
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 20.95 80.04 2.23 39 12 60
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 3.89 17.66 0.26 103 103 103
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 16.29 58.04 1.58 67 49 81
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 13.37 45.22 1.94 85 80 66
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 8.40 25.06 1.03 99 101 96
Lazio Frosinone 23.45 63.54 3.50 33 36 30
Lazio Latina 28.49 65.68 5.65 25 32 19
Lazio Rieti 18.28 51.78 2.66 52 67 42
Lazio Roma 19.17 57.92 2.62 47 52 43
Lazio Viterbo 19.85 59.97 3.06 45 44 35
Liguria Genova 16.43 56.44 1.81 66 55 74
Liguria Imperia 26.11 74.38 4.14 27 21 26
Liguria La Spezia 15.30 49.88 1.84 73 71 70
Liguria Savona 18.23 57.63 2.77 53 53 40
Lombardia Bergamo 15.64 45.47 2.40 70 79 51
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Table 18  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 13.98 46.51 1.82 79 77 71
Lombardia Como 14.89 48.35 2.15 74 73 61
Lombardia Cremona 17.56 62.56 1.67 56 38 78
Lombardia Lecco 9.42 40.67 0.77 96 86 100
Lombardia Lodi 10.41 37.22 1.38 92 91 86
Lombardia Mantova 19.22 53.56 3.44 46 61 31
Lombardia Milano 22.20 68.81 2.76 36 27 41
Lombardia Pavia 11.70 41.73 1.46 88 85 85
Lombardia Sondrio 13.75 51.67 1.66 81 68 79
Lombardia Varese 15.59 53.57 1.75 72 60 76
Marche Ancona 24.41 51.64 3.28 30 69 33
Marche Ascoli Piceno 11.50 25.70 2.07 90 99 63
Marche Macerata 22.10 70.49 2.61 37 26 44
Marche Pesaro Urbino 13.53 45.18 1.85 84 81 69
Molise Campobasso 15.64 43.38 2.24 71 83 59
Molise Isernia 32.89 84.55 5.34 22 6 21
Piemonte Alessandria 18.15 51.91 2.35 54 65 54
Piemonte Asti 23.24 53.36 1.72 34 62 77
Piemonte Biella 16.48 72.07 1.27 65 24 89
Piemonte Cuneo 7.73 28.69 0.85 100 98 99
Piemonte Novara 18.82 58.52 2.31 49 48 55
Piemonte Torino 20.04 59.70 2.44 43 45 49
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
14.18 61.54 1.12 77 41 92
Piemonte Vercelli 12.47 53.25 1.08 87 63 94
Puglia Bari 30.41 74.54 5.42 24 20 20
Puglia Brindisi 51.88 71.09 85.98 6 25 6
Puglia Foggia 39.08 95.22 7.67 15 1 16
Puglia Lecce 43.97 83.17 5.09 11 8 22
Puglia Taranto 39.11 76.62 4.47 14 16 25
Sardegna Cagliari 17.34 64.63 1.95 57 33 65
Sardegna Nuoro 18.59 62.38 2.41 51 39 50
Sardegna Oristano 8.85 35.92 0.89 98 94 98
Sardegna Sassari 19.11 76.59 1.79 48 17 75
Sicilia Agrigento 35.30 48.31 7.92 21 74 15
Sicilia Caltanissetta 38.53 65.78 5.72 19 31 18
Sicilia Catania 47.95 79.57 39.89 8 14 10
Sicilia Enna 37.45 75.49 4.73 20 18 24
Sicilia Messina 32.12 67.97 5.07 23 28 23
Sicilia Palermo 50.46 56.08 89.81 7 56 2
Sicilia Ragusa 41.13 67.66 8.18 13 29 14
Sicilia Siracusa 41.18 77.48 86.29 12 15 5
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Table 18  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 47.92 59.63 88.88 9 46 3
Toscana Arezzo 17.25 55.06 2.27 59 57 56
Toscana Firenze 20.04 66.41 2.37 42 30 52
Toscana Grosseto 16.53 47.43 2.80 64 75 39
Toscana Livorno 14.20 54.08 1.48 76 59 84
Toscana Lucca 15.67 57.15 1.87 69 54 68
Toscana Massa Carrara 10.15 25.38 1.55 93 100 82
Toscana Pisa 13.65 53.14 1.37 83 64 87
Toscana Pistoia 25.11 74.23 1.82 28 22 72
Toscana Prato 22.03 62.02 3.61 38 40 29
Toscana Siena 23.94 43.78 3.68 31 82 28
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 14.37 39.54 1.92 75 87 67
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 9.48 32.76 1.24 95 95 90
Umbria Perugia 17.01 46.64 2.26 61 76 57
Umbria Terni 16.97 36.41 2.45 62 93 48
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 13.83 57.92 1.23 80 51 91
Veneto Belluno 6.70 32.23 0.32 101 96 102
Veneto Padova 11.51 38.16 1.35 89 90 88
Veneto Rovigo 17.57 39.39 3.03 55 88 36
Veneto Treviso 5.78 23.95 0.47 102 102 101
Veneto Venezia 13.70 41.97 1.81 82 84 73
Veneto Verona 17.14 45.54 2.49 60 78 46
Veneto Vicenza 8.98 30.26 1.06 97 97 95
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 19  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 for the case 7
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 24.67 42.84 5.61 52 79 42
Abruzzo L’Aquila 25.62 52.96 5.48 48 54 44
Abruzzo Pescara 32.93 81.51 5.73 22 7 40
Abruzzo Teramo 22.00 62.65 4.59 60 33 54
Basilicata Matera 17.10 42.17 3.19 84 81 84
Basilicata Potenza 29.82 45.31 4.02 32 72 65
Calabria Catanzaro 49.88 66.95 84.94 4 26 3
Calabria Cosenza 36.17 60.79 53.97 18 37 8
Calabria Crotone 44.89 57.99 13.06 9 42 13
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 61.48 65.82 87.51 2 27 1
Calabria Vibo Valentia 38.76 57.22 81.17 14 46 7
Campania Avellino 29.91 41.15 6.37 30 84 32
Campania Benevento 31.53 59.74 6.73 25 39 29
Campania Caserta 54.32 64.74 50.07 3 29 9
Campania Napoli 63.36 72.93 35.98 1 16 12
Campania Salerno 45.89 57.17 38.50 5 47 10
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 27.42 77.21 4.36 42 9 59
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 16.71 43.63 2.77 87 75 90
Emilia-Romagna Forlì Cesena 24.35 48.82 3.18 54 65 85
Emilia-Romagna Modena 19.99 46.51 3.46 69 68 77
Emilia-Romagna Parma 25.30 52.12 4.67 50 56 51
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 14.89 39.53 2.13 92 90 98
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 26.31 89.02 5.77 45 3 38
Emilia-Romagna Reggio Emilia 23.08 45.59 3.12 58 71 86
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 31.40 74.50 5.98 27 12 35
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 19.50 25.56 6.17 72 102 34
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 17.97 35.55 1.66 77 93 102
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 22.93 49.42 3.59 59 63 73
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 11.38 30.34 2.92 102 99 88
Lazio Frosinone 31.63 50.89 6.91 24 60 25
Lazio Latina 33.01 63.19 6.81 21 31 28
Lazio Rieti 21.49 46.49 4.92 64 69 49
Lazio Roma 30.89 84.37 7.74 29 4 19
Lazio Viterbo 21.32 73.03 4.58 65 15 55
Liguria Genova 29.33 72.06 5.14 35 17 46
Liguria Imperia 31.44 94.24 6.89 26 2 26
Liguria La Spezia 26.20 58.30 4.11 46 40 63
Liguria Savona 19.80 57.67 4.60 71 44 53
Lombardia Bergamo 17.73 42.64 3.65 79 80 71
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Table 19  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 23.32 60.55 4.92 57 38 48
Lombardia Como 14.06 43.01 2.51 97 78 94
Lombardia Cremona 16.89 51.44 2.24 86 59 95
Lombardia Lecco 12.68 35.08 1.74 100 94 100
Lombardia Lodi 12.53 37.70 2.16 101 92 96
Lombardia Mantova 14.78 29.19 1.97 94 100 99
Lombardia Milano 29.90 74.37 6.87 31 13 27
Lombardia Pavia 16.60 40.76 3.50 88 86 76
Lombardia Sondrio 18.15 46.52 4.16 75 67 62
Lombardia Varese 19.42 68.30 4.38 73 23 58
Marche Ancona 20.46 58.28 3.54 67 41 75
Marche Ascoli Piceno 19.89 40.66 4.91 70 87 50
Marche Macerata 21.16 76.74 4.00 66 10 66
Marche Pesaro Urbino 21.62 43.14 3.78 63 77 69
Molise Campobasso 26.70 43.48 7.32 43 76 21
Molise Isernia 27.62 57.86 4.10 41 43 64
Piemonte Alessandria 23.46 49.15 4.53 55 64 57
Piemonte Asti 17.22 42.12 1.70 83 82 101
Piemonte Biella 18.00 64.60 2.73 76 30 93
Piemonte Cuneo 14.34 34.13 3.56 96 96 74
Piemonte Novara 15.57 42.11 3.40 91 83 78
Piemonte Torino 21.65 54.95 3.97 62 50 67
Piemonte Verbano Cusio 
Ossola
23.41 69.20 3.76 56 20 70
Piemonte Vercelli 21.71 52.64 4.61 61 55 52
Puglia Bari 27.90 62.13 6.51 40 34 31
Puglia Brindisi 44.89 67.12 82.19 8 25 6
Puglia Foggia 45.50 67.69 11.66 6 24 14
Puglia Lecce 39.01 68.86 5.61 13 21 43
Puglia Taranto 35.71 61.88 4.55 19 35 56
Sardegna Cagliari 37.55 81.70 7.85 16 6 18
Sardegna Nuoro 34.39 65.49 8.99 20 28 16
Sardegna Oristano 17.54 41.03 2.76 80 85 91
Sardegna Sassari 37.47 94.36 8.32 17 1 17
Sicilia Agrigento 24.58 39.03 5.81 53 91 36
Sicilia Caltanissetta 26.37 39.63 5.37 44 89 45
Sicilia Catania 45.12 62.88 38.44 7 32 11
Sicilia Enna 32.60 54.37 5.62 23 51 41
Sicilia Messina 28.34 50.61 4.99 38 61 47
Sicilia Palermo 42.52 49.95 85.23 11 62 2
Sicilia Ragusa 28.26 53.28 7.00 39 52 24
Sicilia Siracusa 44.33 80.26 84.70 10 8 4
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Table 19  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 37.71 48.66 83.64 15 66 5
Toscana Arezzo 28.35 73.04 7.32 37 14 22
Toscana Firenze 29.68 75.51 5.80 34 11 37
Toscana Grosseto 28.51 57.07 7.19 36 48 23
Toscana Livorno 25.00 69.80 4.31 51 19 60
Toscana Lucca 17.36 51.45 2.82 81 58 89
Toscana Massa Carrara 18.68 53.04 6.61 74 53 30
Toscana Pisa 25.80 68.47 6.20 47 22 33
Toscana Pistoia 30.91 61.35 3.31 28 36 81
Toscana Prato 40.94 84.32 10.80 12 5 15
Toscana Siena 20.19 33.76 2.75 68 97 92
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 13.70 40.30 3.81 98 88 68
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 14.66 44.64 3.34 95 74 80
Umbria Perugia 15.86 56.97 3.23 90 49 83
Umbria Terni 17.06 51.94 3.59 85 57 72
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 25.35 57.35 7.40 49 45 20
Veneto Belluno 14.85 34.37 3.29 93 95 82
Veneto Padova 17.87 70.11 4.21 78 18 61
Veneto Rovigo 13.58 26.75 2.15 99 101 97
Veneto Treviso 8.88 24.08 1.60 103 103 103
Veneto Venezia 15.90 46.15 3.35 89 70 79
Veneto Verona 29.78 44.82 5.76 33 73 39
Veneto Vicenza 17.28 31.19 3.04 82 98 87
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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Table 20  Composite index scores and rankings in 2014 when 17 indicators are used to construct indices
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Abruzzo Chieti 29.56 62.06 3.29 65 69 29
Abruzzo L’Aquila 30.65 57.63 2.11 61 80 42
Abruzzo Pescara 43.35 84.49 1.00 13 8 63
Abruzzo Teramo 27.30 63.51 1.04 74 62 61
Basilicata Matera 23.05 53.40 0.00 91 93 76
Basilicata Potenza 37.20 71.82 1.92 36 30 47
Calabria Catanzaro 51.05 83.22 80.25 4 11 5
Calabria Cosenza 37.44 66.43 47.50 35 49 9
Calabria Crotone 45.33 54.01 12.01 9 91 13
Calabria Reggio di Calabria 64.06 80.06 91.06 1 15 1
Calabria Vibo_Valentia 42.93 88.27 76.33 14 5 7
Campania Avellino 34.69 75.59 3.01 45 23 33
Campania Benevento 45.43 66.81 2.28 8 47 41
Campania Caserta 54.63 64.96 51.08 3 55 8
Campania Napoli 57.40 78.59 39.07 2 19 11
Campania Salerno 45.74 79.89 39.43 7 16 10
Emilia-Romagna Bologna 38.30 83.81 0.32 30 9 75
Emilia-Romagna Ferrara 25.03 67.62 0.00 83 43 76
Emilia-Romagna Forlì_Cesena 34.37 64.25 0.00 47 60 76
Emilia-Romagna Modena 25.16 59.85 0.46 81 77 72
Emilia-Romagna Parma 30.79 70.69 1.46 58 34 56
Emilia-Romagna Piacenza 25.42 52.38 0.00 80 94 76
Emilia-Romagna Ravenna 42.12 79.16 0.83 18 18 67
Emilia-Romagna Reggio_Emilia 27.60 62.22 0.00 71 68 76
Emilia-Romagna Rimini 39.24 83.02 1.94 27 13 46
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Gorizia 24.24 67.74 4.59 89 42 24
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Pordenone 21.88 52.29 0.00 94 95 76
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Trieste 36.85 78.39 0.00 38 20 76
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
Udine 18.47 51.80 1.20 102 96 58
Lazio Frosinone 37.44 67.29 3.25 34 44 30
Lazio Latina 39.16 72.03 0.95 28 28 64
Lazio Rieti 25.93 54.42 2.03 77 89 44
Lazio Roma 38.74 67.03 2.69 29 45 37
Lazio Viterbo 30.77 64.35 0.00 60 58 76
Liguria Genova 37.82 73.87 0.37 32 25 73
Liguria Imperia 38.03 97.39 0.00 31 2 76
Liguria La Spezia 31.84 60.27 0.00 55 74 76
Liguria Savona 30.21 83.74 1.14 62 10 60
Lombardia Bergamo 27.48 64.45 0.88 72 56 66
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Table 20  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Lombardia Brescia 30.14 62.90 1.03 64 65 62
Lombardia Como 18.63 41.09 0.00 101 102 76
Lombardia Cremona 28.72 68.10 0.00 67 37 76
Lombardia Lecco 19.46 56.75 0.00 100 86 76
Lombardia Lodi 22.04 54.15 0.00 93 90 76
Lombardia Mantova 24.49 50.10 0.00 88 97 76
Lombardia Milano 39.92 80.13 3.11 25 14 32
Lombardia Pavia 24.93 57.33 1.18 86 84 59
Lombardia Sondrio 25.57 64.30 1.77 79 59 50
Lombardia Varese 28.87 62.92 0.73 66 64 70
Marche Ancona 36.59 59.63 0.00 40 78 76
Marche Ascoli Piceno 25.02 60.78 1.53 84 71 54
Marche Macerata 28.10 63.94 0.00 68 61 76
Marche Pesaro_Urbino 25.04 49.09 0.89 82 98 65
Molise Campobasso 27.72 57.48 4.27 70 83 26
Molise Isernia 41.77 72.57 0.00 22 27 76
Piemonte Alessandria 36.74 68.45 1.49 39 36 55
Piemonte Asti 31.43 71.56 3.30 56 32 28
Piemonte Biella 28.04 85.00 0.00 69 6 76
Piemonte Cuneo 20.90 48.48 1.64 95 100 52
Piemonte Novara 35.00 83.12 1.74 43 12 51
Piemonte Torino 34.70 79.74 1.95 44 17 45
Piemonte Verbano_Cusio_
Ossola
30.93 84.51 0.00 57 7 76
Piemonte Vercelli 30.19 67.84 1.83 63 40 49
Puglia Bari 37.54 65.79 4.08 33 52 27
Puglia Brindisi 46.48 68.04 82.05 6 38 4
Puglia Foggia 48.37 71.84 7.55 5 29 14
Puglia Lecce 44.43 71.70 5.30 11 31 17
Puglia Taranto 41.44 53.93 5.29 23 92 18
Sardegna Cagliari 41.81 91.48 2.31 21 4 40
Sardegna Nuoro 39.32 94.06 5.00 26 3 19
Sardegna Oristano 20.35 57.57 0.00 98 82 76
Sardegna Sassari 42.07 98.25 2.90 19 1 34
Sicilia Agrigento 35.05 59.55 4.86 42 79 23
Sicilia Caltanissetta 40.81 77.55 5.00 24 21 22
Sicilia Catania 44.82 56.65 38.54 10 87 12
Sicilia Enna 35.23 60.55 7.35 41 72 15
Sicilia Messina 33.98 67.96 4.42 49 39 25
Sicilia Palermo 42.50 65.87 84.58 16 51 2
Sicilia Ragusa 41.91 60.04 5.43 20 76 16
Sicilia Siracusa 42.48 75.27 79.03 17 24 6
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Table 20  (continued)
Region Province OCI-Av HOCI LOCI Rank-Av Rank-HOCI Rank-LOCI
Sicilia Trapani 42.62 68.75 83.66 15 35 3
Toscana Arezzo 32.47 65.71 2.80 54 53 36
Toscana Firenze 34.20 63.20 1.29 48 63 57
Toscana Grosseto 36.97 62.50 2.88 37 67 35
Toscana Livorno 30.78 72.77 0.00 59 26 76
Toscana Lucca 24.03 70.75 0.00 90 33 76
Toscana Massa_Carrara 22.47 61.89 3.23 92 70 31
Toscana Pisa 33.96 62.64 2.31 50 66 39
Toscana Pistoia 34.60 66.90 2.49 46 46 38
Toscana Prato 44.07 66.21 5.00 12 50 19
Toscana Siena 33.01 57.63 0.00 52 81 76
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Bolzano 20.74 45.52 1.88 97 101 48
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
Trento 24.70 55.90 0.60 87 88 71
Umbria Perugia 27.17 66.46 0.00 75 48 76
Umbria Terni 27.47 64.44 0.00 73 57 76
Valle d’Aosta Aosta 33.94 76.81 5.00 51 22 19
Veneto Belluno 19.66 67.75 1.55 99 41 53
Veneto Padova 25.65 65.65 0.00 78 54 76
Veneto Rovigo 24.94 57.24 0.00 85 85 76
Veneto Treviso 13.07 35.90 0.36 103 103 74
Veneto Venezia 26.03 60.41 0.76 76 73 68
Veneto Verona 32.69 60.07 2.11 53 75 43
Veneto Vicenza 20.85 48.80 0.74 96 99 69
OCI-Av, HOCI, and LOCI represent index outcomes with the equally-weighted, highest and lowest 
OCI scores, respectively. Rank-Av, Rank-HOCI, and Rank-LOCI represent rankings with the equally-
weighted, highest and lowest OCI scores, respectively
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